The Effingham County Industrial Development Authority the “Authority” brought a petition for declaratory judgment against the Effingham County Board of Commissioners the “Board” seeking a ruling that the Authority “is a public entity owning property for a public purpose and as such is immune from the zoning regulations of the Board.”1 The trial court granted the petition, and the Board appeals.2 Because the trial court issued an advisory opinion, we vacate the judgment. The Authority’s petition for declaratory judgment alleged that it was the fee simple owner of approximately 2600 acres in Effingham County which it had acquired through its condemnation powers and an additional 200 acres which it had purchased. The Authority further alleged that it was under contract to purchase 1550 more acres, “subject to, among other things, zoning.” According to the petition, the previously identified property was not zoned for the uses intended by the Authority. The Authority had filed for an application to rezone one or more of the parcels, but the Authority and the Board were in doubt and in need of declaration of rights with regard to the Authority’s immunity from, and the Board’s right to enforce, the county zoning code.
Notwithstanding these allegations, at the subsequent hearing on its petition, the Authority did not introduce any evidence to show how the Authority planned to use the tracts or whether its use of the tracts would conflict with the current zoning. Compare Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm. v. Bibb County School Dist. , 222 Ga. App. 264 474 SE2d 70 1996 commission denied school district’s application to construct a football stadium; Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Madison , 204 Ga. App. 741 420 SE2d 586 1992 zoning prohibited roof sign planned by the hospital authority.3 Nor did the Authority present any evidence showing, as had been alleged in the petition, that the Authority’s purchase of 1550 acres remained pending “subject to . . . zoning.” Rather, counsel for the Authority stipulated at the petition hearing that the Authority had purchased the tract. Further, no evidence was introduced as to the status of the rezoning applications referenced in the petition. Thus, the facts before the trial court were as follows: the Authority owns property in Effingham County; the Authority contends it is immune from the Board’s zoning regulations; the Board disagrees. A declaratory judgment may not be granted in the absence of a justiciable controversy. The plaintiff must show facts or circumstances whereby it is in a position of uncertainty or insecurity because of a dispute and of having to take some future action which is properly incident to its alleged right, and which future action without direction from the court might reasonably jeopardize its interest. Citation omitted. S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Crews , 253 Ga. App. 765, 767 560 SE2d 331 2002. See OCGA § 9-4-2. “Absent an actual controversy involving palpable insecurity,” the trial court lacks jurisdiction to render a decision. Fourth Street Baptist Church of Columbus v. Bd. of Registrars , 253 Ga. 368, 369 1 320 SE2d 543 1984. See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County , 245 Ga. App. 538, 543 2 b iii 538 SE2d 130 2000; Royal Lepage Real Estate Svcs. of Atlanta v. Spalding Partners, Ltd. , 192 Ga. App. 284, 285 1 384 SE2d 424 1989. And, because the issue is a jurisdictional one, we address the issue irrespective of whether it was raised by the parties. See Lackey v. Lackey , 216 Ga. 177, 178 1 115 SE2d 565 1960; Dept. of Human Resources v. Carlton , 174 Ga. App. 30, 31 329 SE2d 181 1985.
