These companion cases arise out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on September 22, 2001. David Lee Hinton, a driver for motor carrier Cocke Brothers Transportation Systems, Inc. “Cocke”, was operating a tractor trailer on Interstate 20 in Greene County when he rear ended a vehicle driven by John Thompson, Jr. Thompson brought this action for personal injuries against Hinton, Cocke, Sirius American Insurance Company “SAIC” and General Security Insurance Company “GSIC”. Tracie Thompson and David Simpson also filed suit for the wrongful death of their nine-year-old daughter Alicia Simpson, a passenger in John Thompson’s vehicle at the time of the collision. GSIC, which provided insurance coverage to Cocke pursuant to OCGA § 46-7-12, answered and successfully moved to add the Georgia Department of Transportation, Georgia Public Service Commission “PSC”, and the Georgia Department of Motor Vehicle Safety as third-party defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to GSIC on the ground that it cancelled Cocke’s insurance policy effective July 2001, by filing a Form K, Uniform Notice of Cancellation of Motor Carrier Insurance Policies, with the PSC on May 14, 2001. The Thompsons and Simpson appeal, alleging that there is no direct evidence of the actual receipt of any Form K on behalf of GSIC. We disagree and affirm. “To prevail at summary judgment . . . , the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”1 A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiff’s claim, that claim tumbles like a house of cards. All of the other disputes of fact are rendered immaterial. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.2 Our review of the grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo.3
The pertinent issue in this case is whether the insurance policy issued by GSIC effective July 1, 1999, was properly cancelled in July 2001, by the filing of a Form K with the PSC on May 14, 2001. In order to properly address this issue, we must examine the Motor Carrier Act of 1931 the “Act”, OCGA § 42-7-1 et seq., and PSC procedures. The Act gives the PSC the power to regulate the business of persons engaged in the transportation of persons and property for hire on any public highway in this state and provides that a motor carrier cannot operate without first obtaining a certificate from the PSC.4 To obtain a certificate, the common carrier must provide a bond, with adequate security, for the protection of passengers, cargo, and the public against injuries caused by the carrier’s negligence.5 Internal PSC rules provide that a certificate of insurance or “Form E,” evidencing a policy of indemnity insurance, may be filed in lieu of such bond.6 An insurer may cancel a certificate of insurance by sending to the PSC a “Uniform Notice of Cancellation of Motor Carrier Insurance Policies” or Form K.7 PSC rules further provide that any insurance policy shall continue until 30 days after written notice of the cancellation, i.e., Form K, is received in its office.8
