Cherry Haughton sued psychiatrist Suzanne Canning for medical malpractice and invasion of privacy for sending letters containing psychiatric information to Haughton’s other physicians and for releasing her psychiatric records to an attorney. During the jury trial, the trial court granted Canning’s motion for directed verdicts on Haughton’s claims of medical malpractice and invasion of privacy arising from the letters, and for punitive damages. The jury returned a defense verdict on Haughton’s invasion of privacy claim related to the release of her records, and she appeals, contending that the trial court erred in granted the directed verdicts, in failing to give certain jury charges, in making certain evidentiary rulings, and in denying her motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 1. A motion for directed verdict should be granted only if none of the evidence conflicts and all of the evidence demands a particular verdict. Miranda v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp. Auth. , 284 Ga. App. 203, 204-205 1 644 SE2d 164 2007. In considering the motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. “This approach governs the actions of appellate courts as well as trial courts.” Citation and punctuation omitted. Church’s Fried Chicken v. Lewis , 150 Ga. App. 154, 159 1 256 SE2d 916 1979. The standards for granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are the same as those governing the direction of a verdict. Goggin v. Goldman , 209 Ga. App. 251, 252 433 SE2d 85 1993.
2. Haughton first contends that the trial court erred in granting Canning’s motion for a directed verdict on her medical malpractice claims, which were based on Canning’s three letters to Haughton’s treating physicians. Haughton conceded at trial that one of the letters did not constitute medical malpractice, but argues that the jury should have considered whether the two letters Canning sent on August 22, 1997 constituted malpractice.
