Bruce Fink and his dental practice, Bruce Fink DDS, PC, collectively “Fink” appeal from the judgment of the State Court of Cobb County awarding Patricia Dodd $19,058. On May 27, 2003, Dodd filed a complaint against Fink1 averring claims for libel and slander.2 Fink failed to timely answer3 and on January 14, 2004, the court entered a default against him. The court conducted a jury trial on the issue of damages on May 23, 2006. The jury determined damages based on two claims the court deemed admitted by the default: wrongful termination4 and slander.5 The jury awarded Dodd $19,058 in compensatory damages. Fink contends the trial court erred in concluding that Dodd’s claims were conclusively established by virtue of the default, in prohibiting him from offering certain evidence, in charging the jury on wrongful termination, and in allowing Dodd to present certain evidence of damages. For the following reasons, we reverse. 1. In support of his argument that the trial court erred in holding that Dodd’s claims were conclusively established, Fink contends that the court erred in holding that the factual allegations of the complaint were sufficient to carry Dodd’s burden of proof on her slander and wrongful termination claims and in prohibiting him from making any argument or presenting evidence to the contrary at trial. As we have held, a defendant in default is in the position of having admitted each and every material allegation of the plaintiff’s petition except as to the amount of damages alleged. The default concludes the defendant’s liability, and estops him from offering any defenses which would defeat the right of recovery. Citations and punctuation omitted. Cohran v. Carlin , 254 Ga. 580, 585 3 331 SE2d 523 1985. See also OCGA § 9-11-55 a default. However, as Fink correctly points out, the default operates to admit only the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint and the fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from those allegations. As we have explained:
It is axiomatic that a default does not result in the admission of allegations that are not well-pled or that are the result of forced inferences. The failure to answer or to appear at trial serves as an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint, but not of the conclusions of law contained therein. So while a default operates as an admission of the well-pled factual allegations in a complaint, it does not admit the legal conclusions contained therein. A default simply does not require blind acceptance of a plaintiff’s erroneous conclusions of law. Nor does a default preclude a defendant from showing that under the facts as deemed admitted, no claim existed which would allow the plaintiff to recover. Footnotes, punctuation, and emphasis omitted. Grand v. Hope , 274 Ga. App. 626, 629 1 617 SE2d 593 2005; See also Crawford v. Dammann , 277 Ga. App. 442, 453-454 4c 626 SE2d 632 2006. Thus, the default did not preclude Fink from showing that, under the facts as deemed admitted, no claim existed which would allow Dodd to recover. Crawford v. Dammann , 277 Ga. App. at 453-454; ServiceMaster Co. v. Martin , 252 Ga. App. 752 1 556 SE2d 517 2001.
