Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, a judge of the Superior Court of Gwinnett County found Michelle M. Davis guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol, OCGA § 40-6-391 k driver under 21 years of age, alcohol concentration of 0.02 grams or more; and of failing to maintain her lane, OCGA § 40-6-48. Davis appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the results of her Intoxilyzer 5000 alcohol breath test. For the following reasons, we affirm. “We will not disturb the trial court’s order on a motion to suppress if there is any evidence to support it, and we construe all evidence presented in favor of the trial court’s findings and judgment.” Citation omitted. McDaniel v. State , 263 Ga. App. 625, 626-627 1 588 SE2d 812 2003. Where, as here, the evidence was undisputed at the suppression hearing and there is no question as to the credibility of the witnesses, our review of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts is de novo. Daniel v. State , 277 Ga. 840, 849 5 597 SE2d 116 2004.
So viewed, the relevant facts are as follows. On July 17, 2005, an officer with the Lawrenceville Police Department arrested 18-year-old Davis for driving under the influence of alcohol. Davis stipulated that the arrest was supported by probable cause and that the officer read the proper implied consent notice. The officer took Davis to the police department where he administered an Intoxilyzer 5000 alcohol breath test. Davis stipulated that the machine had been inspected and was in good working order and that the officer was certified in the machine’s use. The first test was taken at 3:01 a.m. and yielded a test result showing an alcohol concentration of 0.126 grams. The officer attempted to administer a second test, but Davis was unable to produce an adequate breath sample because she was upset and crying. The State stipulated that Davis’ failure to complete the second test was not a refusal. After Davis calmed down, the officer administered a third test on the same machine at 3:12 a.m. which yielded a test result showing an alcohol concentration of 0.126 grams. Davis contends that the trial court should have suppressed the breath test results because the two breath samples taken were not “sequential” as required by law. We disagree.
