Terry Lincoln Bell appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him for an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Georgia Constitutions. We affirm. The record reveals that Bell was arrested on November 8, 2004. The grand jury returned an indictment against him on February 2, 2005, charging that he hijacked a motor vehicle and attempted to commit armed robbery. On March 8, 2005, Bell filed a pleading entitled “Consolidated Discovery Motion, General Demurrers, and Preliminary Motions to Suppress,” which included a “notice” that he did not and had not waived any federal or state statutory or constitutional rights. On December 29, 2005, Bell filed his first request to file an out of time demand for speedy trial. Between December 29, 2005 and April 26, 2006, Bell filed seven constitutional demands for a speedy trial. On May 10, 2006, Bell filed a motion to dismiss based upon the purported violation of his speedy trial rights. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on September 1, 2006 and denied the motion on November 17, 2006.
The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Federal and Georgia Constitutions and attaches at the time of arrest or when formal charges are brought, whichever is earlier.1 Barker v. Wingo 2 sets forth the four factors to be considered in determining whether an accused’s rights to a speedy trial have been violated: length of the delay; reason for the delay; the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and prejudice to the defense.3 No one factor is regarded as either a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a violation of the right to speedy trial, but they are factors that must be considered in a test balancing the conduct of the State and the defense.4 We remind the bench and the bar that “we will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on a constitutional speedy trial claim absent an abuse of discretion.”5
