This appeal is from the grant of summary judgment to an attorney sued by his former client for legal malpractice. Because the trial court erred in concluding that there is no evidence that the attorney’s alleged negligence proximately caused damage to the former client, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. Shannon Millsaps retained attorney Howard Kaufold to represent her in a divorce action. The final divorce decree was entered pursuant to a settlement agreement under which Millsaps received various pieces of property that, after paying off debts and encumbrances, allegedly netted her approximately $120,000. After the divorce, Millsaps sued Kaufold for legal malpractice, claiming that his failures to identify and name as defendants to the divorce action corporations controlled by Millsaps’ former husband and to file a notice of lis pendens against certain properties allowed the former husband to encumber the properties and dissipate marital assets.
Kaufold moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Millsaps cannot show that Kaufold’s negligence proximately caused her alleged damages. Millsaps appeals. To prevail on a legal malpractice claim, a client must prove that 1 he employed the defendant attorney; 2 the attorney failed to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence; and 3 this failure was the proximate cause of damages to the client. To establish proximate cause, the client must show that but for the attorney’s error, the outcome would have been different; any lesser requirement would invite speculation and conjecture. The defendant attorney is entitled to summary judgment if he shows that there is an absence of proof adduced by the client on the issue of proximate cause.1 In the instant case, Millsaps attached to her complaint an expert affidavit of a divorce lawyer who declared that Kaufold’s failure to file a notice of lis pendens at the time he filed the divorce action was a deviation from the standard of care owed to Millsaps, that his negligence failed to protect Milsaps’ financial interests, that his failure allowed the former husband to obtain an additional loan against property in question, and that the direct result of such failure was that Millsaps suffered financial harm.
