Robert Herndon was indicted in the Superior Court of Fulton County for the offenses of armed robbery, OCGA § 16-8-41; aggravated assault intent to rob, OCGA § 16-5-21 a 1; possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, OCGA § 16-11-106; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, OCGA § 16-11-131. Herndon filed a motion for discharge and acquittal, claiming a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Herndon appeals from the denial of his motion,1 contending a delay of five years and four months between arrest and trial deprived him of a fair trial. For the following reasons, we affirm. In this appeal, Herndon raises a constitutional speedy trial claim rather than a statutory speedy trial claim. See OCGA § 17-7-171 statutory procedure for demanding a speedy trial. Both the Federal and Georgia Constitutions provide that an accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial, but delay alone does not entitle a defendant to a discharge for the denial of a speedy trial. Scandrett v. State , 279 Ga. 632 1 619 SE2d 603 2005; Fleming v. State , 240 Ga. 142, 144 1 240 SE2d 37 1977. The test for determining whether a violation of that right has occurred is established by Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972, which sets forth the four relevant factors to be considered: length of the delay; reason for the delay; the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and, prejudice to the defense. Citations omitted. Scandrett v. State , 279 Ga. at 672 1. “The existence of no one factor is either necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, and a trial court’s findings of fact and its weighing of disputed facts will be afforded deference on appeal.” Citations omitted. Williams v. State , 277 Ga. 598, 599 1 592 SE2d 848 2004. “A trial court’s findings of fact and weighing of those facts in a speedy trial claim generally are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. at 601 1 e.
The record shows the following chronology. On June 6, 1996, Herndon was sentenced to eight years on the offense of robbery by sudden snatching in Troup County “the Troup County offense”. On September 15, 1999, Herndon was released from prison to serve the remainder of his sentence on parole. On February 23, 2000, a man wearing a ski mask robbed a woman at gunpoint in East Point, taking her paycheck and a U. S. Treasury check “the East Point offenses”. Two days later, MARTA police officers arrested Herndon for boarding a MARTA train with a concealed weapon, in violation of OCGA § 16-12-123. In connection with the same weapons charge, Herndon was also charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, OCGA § 16-11-131 collectively “the MARTA offenses”. MARTA police officers found in Herndon’s pockets some items associated with the East Point offenses, including the stolen checks. Consequently, the East Point police placed a “hold” on Herndon for those offenses, and the Board of Pardons and Paroles placed a hold on him as a parole violator.2 On February 29, 2000, an East Point prosecutor swore out a warrant for Herndon’s arrest on the East Point offenses.
