A Muscogee County jury found Jerome Morse guilty of one count of failure to report a collision with an unattended vehicle, one count of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and two counts of resisting, obstructing or opposing a law enforcement officer. The trial court subsequently sentenced Morse as a fourth-time felon under the repeat offender statute, OCGA § 17-10-7 a and c. On appeal, Morse does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, Morse’s sole contention is that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Finding no error, we affirm. In order to successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a criminal defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance so prejudiced the client that there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Citations omitted. Robinson v. State , 278 Ga. 31, 34 3 597 SE2d 386 2004. “The issue of ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact. Under this standard, we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.” Beck v. State , 250 Ga. App. 654, 662 8 551 SE2d 68 2001.
Mindful of these principles, we turn to Morse’s specific allegations of ineffective assistance. Morse first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the State’s repeated references during Morse’s cross-examination to a letter that Morse sent to the District Attorney’s Office prior to trial that described his version of events. The record reflects that the letter was never admitted into evidence and was used by the State only for the purpose of showing that the version of events to which Morse testified at trial were inconsistent with prior statements he had made about how events had transpired. Significantly, Morse does not contest that the statements he made in the letter contradicted his trial testimony, allege that an improper foundation was laid, or argue that the statements were irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. Instead, his sole argument is that his trial counsel should have objected because the State’s references to the letter were allegedly improper under Rule 4.2 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.
