Mary Mabra filed a petition to cancel an allegedly forged quitclaim deed, which transferred Mrs. Mabra’s interest in the marital home to her husband. After Mr. Mabra died, Mrs. Mabra discovered the existence of the deed and sought to enjoin several defendants, including Deutsche Bank & Trust Company, from foreclosing on the house.1 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion and denied Mrs. Mabra’s, and she appeals.2 For reasons that follow, we affirm. A trial court properly grants summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 “A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.”4
Viewed in this manner, the record reveals that Mary and Burtis Mabra married in 1983. However, the two maintained separate finances. Mr. Mabra paid the mortgage, and Mrs. Mabra would write a check to him every month for $500.5 At some point, Mr. Mabra informed his wife that the mortgage had been paid in full, although it had not. In reality, Mr. Mabra continued to obtain loans, solely in his own name, using the house as security. Initially, he obtained a $40,000 loan from FHB Funding Corp. To obtain this loan, Mr. Mabra apparently created a quitclaim deed, purporting to transfer Mrs. Mabra’s interest in the marital home to him, and recorded the quitclaim deed in January 1999. Mrs. Mabra claimed that she never saw nor signed this quitclaim deed. Nonetheless, the security deed for the FHB loan —which also was recorded —showed Mr. Mabra as the sole grantor and provided that he is “lawfully seised of the property hereby conveyed and has the right to mortgage, grant and convey the property.”