In 1996 and again in 2000, the General Assembly amended OCGA § 45-20-2 15, which defines “unclassified service” as that term relates to the State Merit System. Ga. L. 1996, pp. 684, 687 § 2; Ga. L. 2000, pp. 1377, 1382 § 1. The effect of those amendments was to remove persons hired after July 1, 1996 from that class of employees whose employment is subject to the rules of the merit system, as well to expand the definition of “unclassified service” to include those jobs created after that date and those persons who accepted employment in an unclassified position thereafter. Subsequently, two state employees and their union, Services Employees International Union, hereinafter referred to collectively as Employees filed suit in which they challenged the constitutionality of the statutes. They alleged that the amendments to OCGA § 45-20-2 15 violate Art. IV, Sec. III, Par. I b of the Ga. Const. of 1983, which provides, in its entirety, that the State Personnel Board shall provide policy direction for a State Merit System of Personnel Administration and may be vested with such additional powers and duties as provided by law. State personnel shall be selected on the basis of merit as provided by law. Employees specifically contended that Art. IV, Sec. III, Par. I b mandates a state merit system which, as a matter of constitutional law, must include such traditional features as tenure and appeal rights. However, after conducting a hearing, the trial court found that the amendments did not violate the constitutional provision. Employees appeal from that order of the trial court. Employees place primary emphasis on the principle that, in construing Art. IV, Sec. III, Par. I, this Court must consider the intention of the framers and ” ‘ascertain the prior law, the mischief, and the remedy.’ ” Clarke v. Johnson, 199 Ga. 163, 166 33 SE2d 425 1945. However, that is only one of several applicable rules of constitutional construction, all of which must be given full and equal effect. Accordingly, we must presume that acts of the General Assembly are constitutional, and never declare them void ” ‘except in a clear and urgent case. . . .’ Cit.” Brugman v. State , 255 Ga. 407, 414 5 339 SE2d 244 1986. “ Our duty is to construe and apply the Constitution as it is now written.” Buford v. Buford , 231 Ga. 9, 12 200 SE2d 97 1973, overruled on other grounds, Ledford v. Bowers , 248 Ga. 804, 807 2 d 286 SE2d 293 1982. “This Court must honor the plain and unambiguous meaning of a constitutional provision. Cit.” Lowry v. McDuffie , 269 Ga. 202, 206 3 496 SE2d 727 1998. Where a constitutional provision ” ‘is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its terms. Cits.’ Cit.” Hollowell v. Jove , 247 Ga. 678, 681 279 SE2d 430 1981.
For purposes of applying that principle upon which Employees rely most heavily, the relevant “prior law” for determining the intention of the framers of Art. IV, Sec. III, Par. I is “at will” employment. However, all of the other applicable rules of constitutional construction must be applied to determine whether the “mischief” which that constitutional provision was intended to address was the elimination of the spoils system and whether the “remedy” contemplated therein was the creation, as a matter of constitutional law, of a merit system with features such as protection of employees from discharge without cause and a right to appeal adverse employment actions.
