While attending a Valdosta City Council meeting, appellees Fielden and Touchton stood silently as a show of support for another citizen who, after speaking during the “Citizens to be Heard” portion of the meeting, had then refused the mayor’s request to step down from the podium. Appellees were thereafter arrested and charged with violating OCGA § 16-11-34 a, which provides: A person who recklessly or knowingly commits any act which may reasonably be expected to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, gathering, or procession is guilty of a misdemeanor. Appellees challenged the statute contending, inter alia, that it was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The trial court ruled in appellees’ favor and the State appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it describes conduct in a manner so unclear that it leaves intelligent people uncertain as to the limits of its application. Connally v. General Construction Co. , 269 U.S. 385, 391 46 SC 126, 70 LE 322 1926; Johnson v. State , 264 Ga. 590 1 449 SE2d 94 1994. The trial court held that OCGA § 16-11-34 a is unconstitutionally vague because certain phrases are not defined in the Code or lack clarity.1 However, reading the statute according to the natural and obvious import of its language, see generally Foster v. State , 273 Ga. 555 1 544 SE2d 153 2001, we conclude that OCGA § 16-11-34 provides a sufficiently definite warning to a person of ordinary intelligence of the prohibited conduct, namely, the reckless or knowing commission of any act which may reasonably be expected to disrupt or prevent a lawful meeting, gathering or process, and further that it is not susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See generally City of Chicago v. Morales , 527 U.S. 41, 56 III 119 SC 1849, 144 LE2d 67 1999. Thus, we disagree with that part of the trial court’s ruling and hold that the language in OCGA § 16-11-34 a is not vague: it is clear and unambiguous. We agree with the trial court, however, that it is overbroad.
A statute that is clear about what it prohibits can nevertheless be unconstitutionally overbroad if it stifles expression or conduct that is otherwise protected by the Constitution. Johnson v. State , supra, 264 Ga. at 591 1 statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. The doctrine of overbreadth is particularly applicable where a statute infringes upon behavior protected by the First Amendment. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 611-612 93 SC 2908, 37 LE2d 830 1973. The First Amendment is “a broad umbrella that shelters all political points of view and shields a wide range of avenues for expression, including symbolic speech. The 1983 Constitution of Georgia provides even broader protection.” Footnote omitted. State v. Miller , 260 Ga. 669, 671 1 398 SE2d 547 1990. Conduct comes under the protection of the First Amendment when it has some communicative element, id., and thus may be regulated by the government only if “the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom is no greater than necessary to further the governmental interest.” Id. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button , 371 U.S. 415, 433 83 SC 328, 9 LE2d 405 1963, “because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. Cit.”
