The Effingham County Board of Tax Assessors denied Samwilka, Inc.’s1 “Application for Conservation Use Assessment of Agricultural Property.”2 Samwilka appealed to the Effingham County Board of Equalization, which affirmed the denial of the application. In a de novo action, Samwilka appealed to the Superior Court of Effingham County. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment to Samwilka. The Board of Tax Assessors now appeals from the final order of the trial court,3 and we affirm for the reasons set forth below. “Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact remain and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Citations omitted. Pine Pointe Housing v. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Lowndes County , 269 Ga. App. 855, 855-856 605 SE2d 443 2004.
At issue is whether OCGA § 48-5-7.4 b 3 requires that the Board of Tax Assessors reject Samwilka’s application for the current use assessment afforded to bona fide conservation use property.4 The Board of Tax Assessors argues that because seven of Samwilka’s shareholders co-own 2,000 acres of Chatham County property which has been designated as conservation use property,5 the approval of Samwilka’s application would result in those shareholders receiving “any benefit of current use assessment as to more than 2,000 acres,” in violation of OCGA § 48-5-7.4 b 3. The trial court concluded that approval of preferential ad valorem tax treatment for Samwilka’s property would not violate OCGA § 48-5-7.4 b 3 because an individual’s “benefit” in property owned through a tenancy in common should be determined on a pro-rata basis. We agree with the trial court. Well-established principles of statutory construction require that the literal meaning of the words of a statute must be followed unless the result is an absurdity, contradiction, or such an inconvenience that it is clear that the legislature must have intended something else. We must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature, OCGA § 1-3-1 a, and to give each part of the statute meaning and avoid constructions that make some language mere surplusage. All parts of a statute should be harmonized and given sensible and intelligent effect, because it is not presumed that the legislature intended to enact meaningless language. Citations and punctuation omitted. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. , 274 Ga. App. 377, 379 618 SE2d 39 2005. “Exemptions are construed narrowly against the taxpayer and in favor of the tax.” Hicks v. Florida State Bd. of Administration , 265 Ga. App. 545, 550 2 594 SE2d 745 2004.
