Joseph C. Thompson, a Cobb County taxpayer, brought a petition against the Cobb County School Board, its members and its superintendent hereinafter “appellants”, seeking mandamus and injunctive relief regarding appellants’ use of proceeds from a special purpose local option sales tax “SPLOST” for educational purposes. At issue was the $75 million technology portion of the SPLOST proceeds, specifically, appellants’ decision to use $59 million of the technology portion to fund its “Power to Learn” initiative, which would provide a laptop computer for every middle and high school student in the Cobb County School District. Appellee contended that appellants’ decision constituted an abuse of discretion and that appellants were required by statutory and case law to use the SPLOST technology funds to implement the system-wide technology initiatives set out in documents, such as a SPLOST notebook, a facility group report and pamphlets, promulgated by appellants and widely disseminated to obtain voter approval of the SPLOST. The trial court granted appellee’s petition for writ of mandamus and enjoined appellants from proceeding with the Power to Learn initiative. We affirm because appellants were not legally authorized to use the SPLOST proceeds for a purpose entirely different from that contained in the SPLOST documents and the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the Power to Learn initiative was such an entirely different purpose.1 Pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV a , Ga. Const. 1983, the Cobb County Board of Education sought to reimpose a SPLOST for educational purposes. “Proceedings for the reimposition of such a SPLOST shall be in the same manner as proceedings for the initial imposition of the tax.” Id. As to that initial imposition, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV a provides that “except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph,” the SPLOST in all other respects “shall correspond to and be levied in the same manner as the tax provided for by OCGA § 48-8-110 et seq.” See also OCGA § 48-8-141.2 By this language, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV a requires reference to all of the provisions of OCGA § 48-8-110 et seq., “except as otherwise provided” by the constitutional provision.3 The statutory provision pertinent to this appeal is OCGA § 48-8-121 a 1, which requires that a SPLOST “shall be used . . . exclusively for the purpose or purposes specified in the resolution or ordinance calling for imposition of the tax.” See also OCGA § 48-8-111 a 1.4
In this case, the resolution for the reimposition of the SPLOST provided that the funds generated by the SPLOST would be used, in part, on certain designated capital outlay projects, including making system-wide technology improvements, including, but not limited to: acquisition and installation of instructional technology and information systems hardware and associated software, and infrastructure at all schools and selected other facilities . . . . The ballot language sought voter approval to impose the SPLOST for educational purposes including “new schools, land, additions, renovations, equipment, and technology systems.” The SPLOST notebook promulgated by appellants detailed eight “Curriculum/Technology Initiatives,” with an estimated cost for each initiative. Included among the initiatives was “refresh obsolete workstations,” which the notebook estimated required replacing 30,563 units 5 that would affect “students and staff in all academic areas.”
