Following the dismissal of their suit against Athens Regional Medical Center, Inc. “ARMC”, Mercer L. Cox, John Wilson, Kimberly Hogland, Keith Hambrick, and Mary Sue Cox appeal contending that the trial court erred in dismissing their claims for 1 breach of contract, 2 violation of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 3 unjust enrichment, 4 breach of fiduciary duty, and 5 declaratory and injunctive relief.1 Appellants’ claims stem from their allegation that ARMC, which operates a non-profit hospital, charges uninsured patients more than it charges patients covered by insurance or Medicare or Medicaid. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. In response to Cox’s complaint, ARMC filed a motion to dismiss. Because the trial court, without objection, considered a contract between the parties and both parties relied heavily on the contract language before the trial court, ARMC’s motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment. See OCGA § 9-11-12 b “if, on a motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment”. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp .2
So viewed, the record shows that appellants were uninsured patients who received medical treatment from ARMC. Mercer L. Cox was treated for a burn on his hand and charged $941.60; Kimberly Hogland was briefly hospitalized and charged $3,421; Keith Hambrick was treated as an outpatient one afternoon and charged approximately $8,500; Mary Sue Cox was treated briefly in the emergency room and charged approximately $2,386; and John Wilson was charged $10,650.26 for a one-day cardiac catheterization procedure. Appellants allege that these amounts are unduly inflated when compared to the amounts charged to insured patients, who enjoy the benefit of reduced rates negotiated in bulk by insurance companies and government third party payors on behalf of their covered patients.
