John McGahee and Lynne Rogers were divorced in 2001, after less than nine years of marriage. It was the second marriage for both and, although they each had children from their first marriages, they did not have any children together. The final decree incorporated a settlement agreement pursuant to which neither party received alimony. However, the agreement did address the joint marital debts, and specified that each party would assume the obligation to pay certain of them and would indemnify and hold the other harmless for those that he or she assumed. The debts for which McGahee assumed responsibility included one owed to the Internal Revenue Service and another for the loan secured by a car to which he took title and possession. The tax liability was incurred when McGahee withdrew money from his IRA, but failed to include the withdrawn amount as income on the joint return which he and Ms. Rogers filed. The money from the IRA was used for household expenses and other items. After the divorce, McGahee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the two debts were discharged as to him. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service and the holder of the note evidencing the debt secured by the vehicle sought payment from Ms. Rogers. Ms. Rogers filed a criminal contempt action based upon McGahee’s failure to comply with the provision in the divorce decree obligating him to pay the two joint martial debts. The trial court found that he was in violation of the decree, but concluded that it did not have the authority to hold him in criminal contempt because of the discharge of the debts in bankruptcy. We granted Ms. Rogers’ application for a discretionary appeal, reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case, holding as follows: That the debtor former spouse has received a general discharge in bankruptcy does not deprive the state court of its jurisdiction to determine whether certain debts of the debtor former spouse are exempt under § 523 a 5 from dischargeability. Cits. . . . . Accordingly, since there is no evidence that the bankruptcy court made specific determinations that the debt to the IRS and the car loan debt assumed by McGahee in the final judgment and decree of divorce, as well as the “hold harmless” agreements contained therein, were or were not exempt from dischargeability under § 523 a 5, the trial court must exercise its concurrent jurisdiction and make such a determination on each of the three debts at issue. Rogers v. McGahee , 278 Ga. 287, 290 2 602 SE2d 582 2004.
After remand, Ms. Rogers amended her motion so as to seek to have McGahee held in civil contempt. In addition, she sought “an award of attorney’s fees for bringing the motion, including all previous hearings, and appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, and all hearings subsequent to remand of this case.” After conducting a hearing, the trial court found that the debts and the “hold harmless” agreement were in the nature of support and were, therefore, not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Based upon that finding, the trial court concluded that McGahee was in contempt for failing to pay the debts or to indemnify Ms. Rogers for the losses she suffered as a result of his non-payment. In addition to ordering McGahee to pay Ms. Rogers $2,143, the trial court awarded her $12,160 in attorney’s fees, concluding that his “stubborn stance when dealing with her forced the unnecessary expansion and increased expense of this proceeding . . . .”
