Anthony Giddens, who was employed as an investigator for the District Attorney of the Alapaha Judicial Circuit, was indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit theft of Berrien County property, various counts of theft by taking of County property, and other offenses involving concealment and falsification of County public records. After nearly five years passed without a trial on the charges, Giddens filed a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment on the basis that the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Berrien County Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed the indictment, and the State appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the accused has a right to a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution. The test for determining whether that right has been violated is set forth in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972, which provides that four factors are taken into consideration: length of the delay; reason for the delay; defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to the defense. Boseman v. State , 263 Ga. 730, 731 438 SE2d 626 1994. None of the factors are regarded as necessary or sufficient to finding deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, but rather “the factors should be considered together in a balancing test of the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant.” Id. at 731 punctuation and citation omitted. On appeal, “the question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that Giddens’s speedy trial rights were violated.” State v. Redding , 274 Ga. 831-832 561 SE2d 79 2002.
As to the first Barker factor —the length of the delay —the right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of arrest or the time of formal charges, whichever is earlier. Scandrett v. State , 279 Ga. 632, 633 619 SE2d 603 2005. Giddens was not arrested until after the indictment in this case, and he was released on bond a few days after the arrest. The length of the delay from the January 31, 2000 date of the indictment to the December 20, 2004 date on which Giddens moved for dismissal of the indictment based on his speedy trial right was nearly five years. The initial inquiry in considering the length of delay factor is whether the delay was long enough to create “presumptive prejudice.” Scandrett , 279 Ga. at 633. If the delay passes the threshold test of “presumptive prejudice,”1 then a speedy trial analysis under the other Barker factors is triggered, and “the delay is then considered a second time by factoring it into the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis, with the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifying over time.” Scandrett , 279 Ga. at 633 punctuation and citation omitted. Since it may generally be said that “any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial,” and the delay in Giddens’s prosecution far exceeded eight months, the threshold requirement of presumptive prejudice was met, and the trial court properly considered the other Barker factors to determine if Giddens was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Scandrett 279 Ga. at 634 punctuation and citation omitted.
