Justin Zale Jones was tried before a jury and was convicted of armed robbery and improper display of license plates. On direct appeal, two of his four enumerations were that a show-up identification of him by the victim was improperly admitted into evidence and that the jury’s verdict was not voluntarily reached. Deeming these two enumerations to be abandoned because of appellate counsel’s failure to support them with citations to the record or with legal argument, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in an unpublished opinion. Jones v. State , 246 Ga. App. XXVII 2000. As for the remaining two issues, one was waived in the trial court, and the other, having been raised and argued by appellate counsel, was considered and resolved on the merits in the Court of Appeals. Jones subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In its order, the habeas court initially considered the substance of the two issues previously abandoned in the Court of Appeals and found that Jones’ due process rights were violated. The habeas court then ruled that, although it was unnecessary to reach the issue, appellate counsel was ineffective in pursuing the direct appeal, and that the issues raised by Jones on habeas were not procedurally barred or waived. Accordingly, the habeas court granted relief and ordered “a new trial on the impermissibly suggestive identification and jury verdict issues.” The Warden filed a timely notice of appeal from this order.
1. More than three and a half months after the notice of appeal was filed, the habeas court entered an amended order “to make clear that Habeas relief was also granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” The Warden contends that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction to amend its original order during the pendency of this appeal. Jones responds that the court merely corrected a clerical mistake pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 g. However, not even that option is available since the filing of the notice of appeal operates as a supersedeas and deprives the trial court of the power to affect the judgment appealed, so that subsequent proceedings purporting to supplement, amend, alter or modify the judgment, whether pursuant to statutory or inherent power, are without effect. Cits. Brown v. Wilson Chevrolet-Olds , 150 Ga. App. 525, 531 2 258 SE2d 139 1979. See also Kidd v. Unger , 207 Ga. App. 109, 111 3 427 SE2d 82 1993. The habeas “court’s amended order, therefore, cannot be considered for purposes of this appeal,” even if a remand becomes necessary as a consequence. Kidd v. Unger , supra.
