A jury found Eddie Lamar Sanders guilty of voluntary manslaughter, which was a lesser included offense in a malice murder count; three alternative counts of felony murder; and, three separate counts which charged the underlying felonies of arson in the first degree, aggravated battery, and aggravated assault with an object which resulted in serious bodily injury. The jury also returned a verdict of not guilty as to aggravated assault with intent to murder. The trial court treated the voluntary manslaughter verdict as surplusage, entered judgment on all three felony murder counts, merged the underlying felony counts, and sentenced Sanders as a recidivist to life imprisonment without parole. The trial court granted Sanders an out-of-time appeal and subsequently denied a motion for new trial.1 1. Construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, the evidence shows that Sanders and his girlfriend, Ann Strickland, attended a party, returned home, and had an argument. In the second of three statements which he gave to police, Sanders admitted that, after Ms. Strickland went to bed, he poured gasoline on the bed and on her, and lit a cigarette lighter. In the other two statements and at trial, Sanders asserted that Ms. Strickland was the one who poured gasoline on him and produced the cigarette lighter, and that he was struggling with her over the gasoline can and the lighter when the flames erupted. The victim died as a result of burn injuries and smoke inhalation. Although Sanders himself was burned, he left the house, returned to the scene of the party, stated that he was scared and had been playing with gas, asked for a ride to a relative’s house, and only later sought treatment for his burns and was hospitalized.
The evidence clearly was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Sanders guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the three felony murder counts. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979; Lowe v. State , 276 Ga. 538, 539 1 579 SE2d 728 2003; Alexander v. State , 263 Ga. 474, 475 1 435 SE2d 187 1993; Johnson v. State , 246 Ga. App. 109, 111 2 539 SE2d 605 2000. However, the jurors were authorized not only to accept that portion of Sanders’ second statement wherein he admitted the intentional and unjustified act of pouring gasoline and lighting it, but also to accept his testimony that the victim initially poured gasoline on him and produced a lighter. See Adams v. State , 274 Ga. 854, 855 3 561 SE2d 101 2002; Brown v. State , 236 Ga. App. 166, 169-170 4 511 SE2d 276 1999. This is true even though Sanders’ own statements were the only eyewitness accounts presented at trial. See Daniel v. State , 224 Ga. App. 673, 674 1 482 SE2d 409 1997. From Sanders’ testimony, the jury could find “a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person . . . .” OCGA § 16-5-2 a. ” ‘It is generally a question for the jury to determine whether . . . the slayer acted from passion,’ cit. rather than with malice.” Brinson v. State , 276 Ga. 671, 672 1 581 SE2d 548 2003. Accordingly, when the evidence is construed most strongly in support of the verdict, it is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Sanders guilty of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt because, although he intentionally poured gasoline on the victim and set her on fire, he did so only after he was provoked by the victim’s act of pouring gasoline on him and producing a lighter. Jackson v. Virginia , supra; Darden v. State , 271 Ga. 449, 450 1 519 SE2d 921 1999; Sinkfield v. State , 262 Ga. 555, 556 2 422 SE2d 851 1992.
