In this slip and fall case, Cathy Turner appeals the grant of summary judgment to Wendy’s International, Inc. “Wendy’s”, contending that the trial court erred because issues of material fact precluded the grant of summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we must reverse. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. 1 So viewed, the record shows that in April 2003, Turner and her sisters were eating lunch at a Wendy’s restaurant. As they sat in the dining area, which was carpeted, a Wendy’s employee set up at least one “wet floor” warning sign and mopped the tiled areas of the floor by the bathrooms, counter, and exits. After the women finished eating, they left their table and began walking to an exit. When Turner, who walks with a cane, stepped from the carpet to the tile, which was wet from the mopping, she slipped and fell, injuring herself.
Turner filed suit against Wendy’s, seeking compensation for her injuries. After discovery, Wendy’s moved for summary judgment, arguing that their employee had observed the proper standard of care and that Wendy’s had not breached any duty it owed to Turner. Turner argued that the employee was negligent in mopping while too many customers were present, that the employee was negligent in failing to adequately wring out the mop, and that the employee did not adequately place signs warning about the wet floor. The trial court granted Wendy’s motion, giving rise to this appeal. In order to recover for injuries sustained in a slip-and-fall action, an invitee must prove 1 that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and 2 that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite the exercise of ordinary care due to actions or conditions within the control of the owner/occupier. However, the plaintiff’s evidentiary proof concerning the second prong is not shouldered until the defendant establishes negligence on the part of the plaintiff —i.e., that the plaintiff intentionally and unreasonably exposed herself to a hazard of which the plaintiff knew or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known. Robinson v. Kroger Co. 2 See also Hardee’s Food Systems v. Green 3 applying Robinson analysis to floor cleaning scenario.
