In 2006, the General Assembly enacted SB 386, which redrew three state senate districts in the Athens area. Appellant-plaintiffs, who are voters in the newly drawn districts, initially brought an action in federal court attacking the enactment on both constitutional and statutory grounds. However, their claims were found to be meritless. Kidd v. Cox , __FSupp2d__ N.D. Ga. 2006. Appellants then filed this state action, in which they challenged the constitutionality of the enactment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the statute violates Art. III, Sec. II, Par. II of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, which provides: The General Assembly shall apportion the Senate and House districts. Such districts shall be composed of contiguous territory. The apportionment of the Senate and of the House of Representatives shall be changed by the General Assembly as necessary after each United States decennial census. After conducting a hearing, the trial court found no merit in the constitutional challenge and dismissed their complaint. Appellants appeal from that order. 1. Appellants acknowledge that, under the Georgia Constitution of 1976, the General Assembly had the discretionary authority to redraw the districts whenever it wished. However, they maintain that that discretionary power was the result of wording which was not carried forward into present Art. III, Sec. II, Par. II. In relevant part, Art. III, Sec. II, Par. I of the former Constitution provided that the General Assembly may create, rearrange and change Senatorial Districts as it deems proper. . . . The apportionment of the Senate shall be changed by the General Assembly, if necessary, after each United States decennial census becomes official. According to Appellants, since present Art. III, Sec. II, Par. II no longer provides that the General Assembly “may” reapportion itself “as it deems proper,” it lacks the discretionary power to do so more frequently than once every ten years.
“In construing a constitutional provision, the ordinary signification shall be applied to words. Cits.” Thomas v. MacNeill , 200 Ga. 418, 424 37 SE2d 705 1946. The former constitutional provision did not specify that the General Assembly could reapportion the districts “whenever” it chose to do so. Instead, it provided that the General Assembly “may create, rearrange and change” the districts “as it deems proper.” In their ordinary meaning, the words “create, rearrange and change” do not implicate any concept of time. Instead, they are verbs which are expressive of the act of engaging in a transformative undertaking. Thus, under the former constitutional provision, the General Assembly was authorized to fashion and configure reapportioned districts in any manner or form “as it deemed proper.” Appellants may be correct that the General Assembly no longer has that discretionary power. Under present Art. III, Sec. II, Par. II, any district created, rearranged or changed by the General Assembly must be composed of contiguous territory, and not simply “as it deems proper.” Insofar as the frequency of reapportionment is concerned, however, the former and present constitutional provisions are essentially identical. Both specify that the General Assembly “shall” reapportion itself when the census renders that act “necessary.”
