We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Court of Appeals was correct when it affirmed the trial court’s sentencing of Mack Butler to life imprisonment without parole as a recidivist under both OCGA § 16-13-30 d and OCGA § 17-10-7 c. See Butler v. State , 277 Ga. App. 57 4 625 SE2d 458 2005. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Butler was indicted on a charge of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act based on his July 22, 1994 sale of a $20 piece of cocaine to an undercover police officer. See OCGA § 16-13-30 b. The State filed notice of its intent to seek punishment as a repeat offender pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 c, the general recidivist statute; the notice also referenced OCGA § 16-13-30 d, the specific recidivist statute for persons with prior felony convictions who are convicted of violating subsection b of OCGA § 16-13-30. Butler was convicted in March 1996 and during sentencing, the State introduced certified copies of Butler’s three prior convictions for the sale of cocaine.1 Under the version of OCGA § 16-13-30 d in effect at the time the crime was committed, life imprisonment was the sole prescribed punishment for a defendant who had one or more prior felony convictions. In addition to the life sentence under the specific recidivist statute, the trial court applied the provisions of the general recidivist statute, OCGA § 17-10-7, specifically, subsection c. That subsection provides upon conviction for a fourth felony offense that the defendant serve the maximum sentence provided in the sentence of the judge without parole. Accordingly, the trial court imposed on Butler a life sentence without the possibility of parole.
Relying on the principle that ” ‘a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent,’ ” footnote omitted Mann v. State , 273 Ga. 366, 368 541 SE2d 645 2001, Butler argues that only OCGA § 16-13-30 d, the specific recidivist statute, applied at the time he committed his offense in July 1994 because the Legislature did not indicate its intent for the general recidivist provisions in OCGA § 17-10-7 to prevail over the specific statute until July 1, 1996, the effective date of the amendment to OCGA § 16-13-30 d that expressly references OCGA § 17-10-7.2 The State disagrees, arguing that the Legislature’s intent that OCGA § 17-10-7 prevail over specific recidivist statutes was previously expressed in the language of OCGA § 17-10-7 e, which provides that “ this Code section is supplemental to other provisions relating to recidivous offenders.”
