Georgia Community Support and Solutions, Inc. GCSS, a non-profit organization which assists disabled adults and their families, placed Shirley Berryhill’s mentally handicapped son with providers of personal care. Subsequently, in a web posting and in e-mails to employees of a major newspaper and of the Department of Human Resources, Ms. Berryhill asserted that her son was suffering from poor treatment and care. When she failed to comply with its demand for a retraction and apology, GCSS brought suit for tortious interference with business relationship and libel per se. GCSS submitted the verifications required by Georgia’s anti-SLAPP Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation statute. OCGA § 9-11-11.1 b. The trial court dismissed the action, finding, among other things, that Ms. “Berryhill’s statements satisfied the threshold requirement for applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute because they ‘were made in furtherance of her right to free speech about an issue of public concern . . . .’ ” Georgia Community Support & Solutions v. Berryhill , 275 Ga. App. 189, 191-192 1 620 SE2d 178 2005. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “ the anti-SLAPP statute does not encompass all statements that touch upon matters of public concern. Rather, by its terms, the statute’s application is limited to” those statements which come within the definition found in OCGA § 9-11-11.1 c. Georgia Community Support & Solutions v. Berryhill , supra at 192 1. This Court granted certiorari to consider that issue. Because the Court of Appeals properly construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we affirm. The verification requirement of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 b applies to any claim asserted against a person or entity arising from an act “which could reasonably be construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances . . . in connection with an issue of public interest or concern . . . .” Under the definition of subsection c, such act includes any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, or any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. Ms. Berryhill argues that the word “includes” in this statute should be broadly construed as a term of enlargement or illustration. In support of this argument, the only precedent from this Court on which she relies is Housing Auth. of City of Carrollton v. Ayers , 211 Ga. 728, 729 3 a 88 SE2d 368 1955, which notes that “a statutory definition of a term as ‘including’ certain things does not necessarily put a meaning thereon limited to the inclusion. Cit.” Emphasis supplied. See also Arizona Water Co. v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Resources , 770 P2d 370, 373 Ariz. App. 1988 placing the same emphasis in a nearly identical quote. As the Court of Appeals has stated, “the word ‘includes’ is susceptible of meaning, inter alia, either ‘encompasses’ or ‘is equivalent to’ . . . .” Community Bankers Assn. of Ga. v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce , 193 Ga. App. 569, 571 2 388 SE2d 387 1989. This principle is consistent with the case law in numerous other jurisdictions. “It is generally held that the meaning of the words ‘including’ or ‘includes’ depends upon the context and that sometimes they are not words of illustration or enlargement. Cits.” Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett , 754 A2d 367, 375 III A Md. 2000. “The word ‘include’ is also commonly used in a restrictive, limiting sense. Cits.” Auer v. Commonwealth , 621 SE2d 140, 144 II Va. App. 2005.
In Helvering v. Morgan’s , 293 U. S. 121, 125 55 SC 60, 79 LE 232 1934, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized “that the term ‘includes’ may sometimes be taken as synonymous with ‘means’ . . . .” See also Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett , supra. The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the word ” ‘may have the sense of addition . . . and of “ also;” but . . . may “merely specify particularly that which belongs to the genus.” ‘ Montello Salt Co. v. Utah , 221 U. S. 452, 464-465, 31 S. Ct. 706, 708, 55 LE 810, 814 1911 . . . .” Arizona Water Co. v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Resources , supra. Dictionary authority is consistent with this construction of the term “includes.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern American Usage 363 1998 remarking that the word “include,” “which traditionally has introduced a nonexhaustive list, is now . . . widely used for consists of “. Used in this limiting sense, the term typically introduces an exhaustive list of all of the components or members that make up the whole. See Garner, supra; Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 667-68 2000 . . . . Thus, when a statute uses the word “include” in this restrictive, limiting sense to define a term, it sets forth the entire definition, and no other elements or items are includable. Consequently, the fact that the statute does not expressly enumerate a particular item implies that the item “falls outside of the definition.” Cits. Emphasis in original. Auer v. Commonwealth , supra. See also Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett , supra quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. 1979.
