William Croft appeals, pro se, from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Fairfield Plantation Property Owners Association, Inc., Kristen Bonner,1 and Don Harmon2 and denying Croft’s motion for summary judgment. Croft contends the trial court’s order requiring him to pay homeowners association fees should be reversed because his purchase of the subject properties in a tax sale did not convey fee simple title obligating him to pay homeowners association fees. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and affirm. “Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cit. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Cit.3 The undisputed evidence shows that, on June 6, 2000 and July 5, 2000, Croft purchased a total of seven residential lots in the Fairfield Plantation subdivision at a tax sale resulting from unpaid property taxes.4 These lots are subject to restrictive covenants running with the land that require the payment of homeowners association assessments for maintenance of the common areas in the subdivision. One of the covenants provides that: Every person upon acquiring title, legal or equitable, to any lot in the Subdivision shall become a member of the Fairfield Plantation Property Owners Association, Inc.,5 a Georgia non-profit corporation, herein referred to as “Association” and as long as he is the owner of any such lot, he must remain a member of the Association. Such membership is not intended to apply to those persons who hold an interest in any lot merely as security for the performance of an obligation to pay money, e.g., mortgages, deeds of trust, or real estate contract purchases. However, if such a person should realize upon his security and become the real owner of a lot, he will then be subject to all the requirements and limitations imposed in these Restrictions on owners of lots within the Subdivision and on members of the Association, including those provisions with respect to payment of annual charges. When Croft refused to pay the Association’s annual charges for the lots, it hired a collection agency and later filed liens against the properties. Croft then filed suit against the Association, Bonner, and Harmon seeking $1 million in damages for extortion and removal of the liens. The Association counterclaimed for the unpaid assessments, late charges, interest, and its attorney fees. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Croft’s claims and also granted summary judgment to the Association on its counterclaim for past due assessments, late fees, interest, and attorney fees.
1. Croft contends that the title he acquired in the tax sale was insufficient to trigger membership in the Association and an obligation to pay annual assessments. In support of this argument, Croft points to the statutory right of redemption granted to his predecessors in title.6 OCGA § 48-4-40 provides that title can be restored to specified predecessors through payment of the statutory amount of redemption within 12 months from the date of the sale, or at any time before the right to redeem is foreclosed by the tax sale purchaser giving of notice under OCGA § 48-4-45. Another mechanism by which the purchaser at a tax sale can cut off the right of redemption is through adverse possession of the property for the requisite number of years after the tax deed is recorded.7 Croft argues that since he did not exercise his right to cut off the right of redemption through either 1 the giving of notice 12 months after the tax sale; or 2 adversely possessing the property, he does not have fee simple title and is not obligated to pay the Association’s assessments.
