Cambridge Property Owners Association the “Association” sued Bernard Mitchell, seeking an injunction to compel Mitchell to return his resurfaced driveway in the Cambridge Subdivision to its original state. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the injunction. Mitchell appeals, contending 1 that the trial court erred in holding that the language of the Cambridge covenants required Mitchell to seek the Association’s approval before resurfacing his driveway; and 2 that the trial court’s interpretation renders the covenants so indefinite that they become void. For reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm. Mitchell’s home in the Cambridge subdivision is subject to certain restrictive covenants. The covenants provide in pertinent part that: no building, storage house, cabana, fence, wall, swimming pool, or other structure shall be commenced, erected or maintained, nor shall any addition to, exterior change or alteration thereto be made, until the plans and specifications showing the nature, kind, shape, height, materials, floor plans, exterior color scheme, location, approximate square footage and the grading and landscaping of the lot shall have been submitted to and approved in writing by the Architectural Control Committee. The Architectural Control Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any such building plans, specification, site plans, landscaping or grading plans which are not suitable or desirable in its sole opinion for any reason, including purely aesthetic reasons. After purchasing the property, Mitchell resurfaced his driveway without the approval of the Association’s Architectural Control Committee the “Committee”, in a manner that the Committee found unsuitable for aesthetic reasons.
1. Mitchell contends that the trial court erred in holding that the explicit language of the covenants required him to seek the approval of the Committee before resurfacing his driveway. Specifically, he argues that a driveway is not a “structure” and thus does not fall within the covenants’ restrictions. Restrictive covenants are specialized contracts that run with the land.1 Contract interpretation is a three-step process: initially, construction is a matter of law for the court. First, the trial court must decide whether the language is clear and unambiguous. If it is, the court simply enforces the contract according to its clear terms; the contract alone is looked to for its meaning. Next, if the contract is ambiguous in some respect, the court must apply the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. Finally, if the ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be resolved by a jury or other factfinder. The existence or nonexistence of an ambiguity is a question of law for the court. If the court determines that an ambiguity exists, however, a jury question does not automatically arise, but rather the court must first attempt to resolve the ambiguity by applying the rules of construction in OCGA § 13-2-2.2 The language of the covenant at issue does not expressly state whether its restrictions on the construction or alteration of structures apply to a driveway. Thus, we must apply the rules of contract construction to resolve this ambiguity. Among those rules is the provision that “words generally bear their usual and common signification.”3 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “structure” as “any construction, production, or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts purposefully joined together.”4 A driveway certainly meets this definition. A driveway is a construction composed of parts purposefully joined together. A driveway, then, is a “structure” within the common meaning of that term as well as the meaning of the covenants.5
