In this probation revocation case, the State appeals from the trial court’s order granting Corey DeWayne Williams’s motion to suppress. Because the trial court correctly concluded that the “no-knock” provision in the search warrant was unsupported by particular facts and circumstances justifying the need for its use and that no exigent circumstances were shown, we affirm. Williams was originally charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. In April, 2004, he pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and was sentenced to seven years, to be served on probation. Later that year, a police officer received information from a confidential informant that Williams was selling cocaine from his residence, as well as complaints from neighbors that there was “a lot of traffic to the residence.” On August 12, 2004, the officer appeared before a magistrate and submitted an affidavit and application for a search warrant, requesting a “no-knock” provision. The affidavit consisted of a pre-printed form with spaces provided for additional information. The “no-knock” section of the form contains a printed provision stating: I am seeking a “No Knock” provision so that entry can be made without knocking and without giving verbal notice of the lawful authority and purpose in execution of this search warrant. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the giving of verbal notice would: check applicable greatly increase the peril to officers executing this warrant; lead to the immediate destruction of the evidence sought. In support, thereof, I state the following facts: Both boxes are checked on the form. A blank follows for the inclusion of facts. In that space, the officer stated, “Affiant asked that a no-knock clause be included in this search warrant and affidavit as based on affiant’s experience and knowledge cocaine can be easily destroyed and by forwarning sic the occupant’s sic could greatly increase the danger and risk to officer’s sic executing this search warrant.”
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the officer testified that because of his experience as a drug task force officer, he “requested the no-knock based on the probability that if we were delayed getting into the residence, not knowing how much cocaine would actually be in the house, that it could possibly be destroyed or flushed.” Asked if this was “standard language,” the officer replied, “I won’t say it is standard, but, yes, sir, it is —if we don’t have anything else to go on.” Asked why he had checked both boxes, including the one indicating peril to officers executing the warrant, he responded, “the reason there is my knowledge and experience.” He acknowledged, however, that he knew Williams and had never known him to be violent, carry a gun, or resist arrest. He added, “I didn’t have any specifics to give other than based on my knowledge and experience that things change in a search warrant . . . . the evidence can easily be destroyed because it has been destroyed numerous times, not with this particular person but it has been in the past.” Questioned by the trial court, the officer confirmed that no testimony was given to the magistrate outside the four corners of the affidavit itself.
