The grand jury handed down two indictments against Darian Scandrett, one alleging that he committed a murder in 1997 and the other charging him with another murder committed in 2000. He filed a motion to dismiss the indictments, alleging excessive pre-trial delay in his prosecution. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and Scandrett appeals directly from that ruling. See Callaway v. State , 275 Ga. 332 567 SE2d 13 2002. 1. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Federal and Georgia Constitutions. Boseman v. State , 263 Ga. 730, 731 1 438 SE2d 626 1994. The test for determining whether a violation of that right has occurred is established by Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972, which sets forth the four relevant factors to be considered: length of the delay; reason for the delay; the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and, prejudice to the defense. Boseman v. State , supra at 731 1.
a Length of the delay . The length of the delay “actually figures into the speedy trial analysis in two respects.” Boseman v. State , supra at 732 1 a. To trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from “presumptively prejudicial” delay, cit., since, by definition, he cannot complain that the government has denied him a “speedy” trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. Cit. Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647, 651-652 II 112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992. Thus, the initial determination is whether the delay in the prosecution is of such length as to demonstrate “presumptive prejudice.” “If the delay passes this threshold test of ‘presumptive prejudice,’ then the Barker inquiry is triggered.” Boseman v. State , supra at 732 1 a. “The delay is then considered a second time by factoring it into the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis, with ‘the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifying over time.’ Cits.” Boseman v. State , supra at 732 1 a. A delay which approaches one year is generally deemed to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Doggett v. United States , supra at 652 II, fn. 1; Boseman v. State , supra.
