In Solomon v. Barnett , 269 Ga. App. 779 605 SE2d 599 2004, we determined that the trial court correctly concluded that William Solomon d/b/a Graphic Engineering, plaintiff below, dealt with W. Harry Barnett not in Barnett’s personal capacity, but only through Barnett’s corporate entities, and that the corporations’ reinstatements were retroactive as a matter of law. Pursuant to grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court “for its resolution of Solomon’s equitable estoppel argument, which was properly before that Court. State v. Tye , 276 Ga. 559, 562 580 SE2d 528 2003.” Therefore, Division 3 of Solomon v. Barnett , supra, is hereby vacated and the following substituted therefor.
3. In Enumeration I B., Solomon contends that the trial court erred in not finding Barnett equitably estopped and in failing to prevent Barnett from taking unfair advantage of the retroactive reinstatements to Solomon’s detriment. Estoppels are not generally favored. OCGA § 24-4-24 a. . . . ‘In order to constitute estoppel by conduct, there must concur, first, a false representation or concealment of facts; second, it must be within the knowledge of the party making the one or concealing the other; third, the person affected thereby must be ignorant of the truth; fourth, the person seeking to influence the conduct of the other must act intentionally for that purpose; and, fifth, persons complaining shall have been induced to act by reason of such conduct of the other.’ Tinsley v. Rice , 105 Ga. 285, 290 31 S.E. 174. ‘Where the facts relied on to establish the estoppel do not unequivocally show an estoppel in pais, the jury, and not the judge, should determine whether the facts constitute such an estoppel.’ Tune v. Beeland , 131 Ga. 528 3 62 S.E. 976; Hughes v. Cobb , 195 Ga. 213, 231 23 S.E.2d 701. Calhoun v. Williamson , 76 Ga. App. 91, 93 2 45 SE2d 87 1947. See also Smithloff v. Benson , 173 Ga. App. 870, 874 3 328 SE2d 759 1985.