We granted Andrew Bowens’ application for discretionary review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of cocaine taken from his person after a drug sniffing dog alerted on the exterior of his vehicle during the course of a valid traffic stop. Bowen concedes that the use of a drug sniffing dog to conduct a free air search around the exterior of a vehicle during the course of a lawful traffic stop does not implicate the Fourth Amendment under the United States Constitution. See Illinois v. Caballes , __U. S.__, 125 SC 834, 160 LE2d 842 2005. He instead asserts that in the absence of a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal drug activity, such a practice violates the 1983 Georgia Constitution.1 We disagree and affirm. In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, and the court’s findings are analogous to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed when the record contains any evidence to support those findings. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the evidence must be construed most favorably toward the court’s findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Further, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider all the evidence of record, including evidence introduced at trial. Citations, footnote, and punctuation omitted. McCray v. State , 268 Ga. App. 84 601 SE2d 452 2004. So viewed, the evidence shows that on or about December 28, 2002, Savannah Police Officer Brian Lee stopped Bowens after observing that he was not wearing a seat belt and was driving a vehicle with a paper “drive-out” tag. Officer Lee approached Bowens’ vehicle and asked for Bowens’driver’s license and proof of registration. Approximately two minutes later, while Officer Lee was running a computer check on Bowens’ license and registration, a second officer arrived on the scene with a drug sniffing dog2 and walked the dog around the vehicle. After the dog alerted on the driver’s side door, Officer Lee asked Bowens to exit his vehicle and requested Bowens’ consent to search his person. Bowens agreed. The officer subsequently discovered and seized six rocks of crack cocaine from a plastic bag protruding from Bowens’ sock. The entire incident, from stop to arrest, was over in approximately 5 minutes.
As an initial matter, we note that the initial stop of Bowens for the seat belt violation was lawful, a point conceded by Bowens in the trial court. See Fernandez v. State , 2005 WL 1966320 6 3 b i, A05A1046, A05A1047 Ga. App., August 17, 2005; Davis v. State , 232 Ga. App. 320, 321-322 1 501 SE2d 836 1998. We further note that the traffic stop was not prolonged by virtue of the dog’s free air search around the exterior of the vehicle. At the time the dog alerted on the door, the traffic stop was still in progress. Officer Lee was running a computer check on Bowens’ license and registration.3 See Byers v. State , 272 Ga. App. 664, 666 613 SE2d 193 2005. Thus, Bowens posits that the sole issue on appeal “is whether the Georgia Constitution prohibits a ‘free air search’ during a purportedly valid traffic stop in which the police do not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion of any illegal drug activity.” We have previously decided this issue adversely to Bowens’ contention. The area around a car is not an area protected by the Fourth Amendment or Par. XIII of Art. I, Sec. I of the Georgia Constitution . The owner or driver of an automobile has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the airspace surrounding the car. The use by the officer of a canine’s enhanced through training olfactory sense cannot convert a sniff of the air around the exterior of the car into an unreasonable search of the interior of the car. Since the drug dog’s sniffing of the exterior of the vehicle did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or the Georgia Constitution, . . . reasonable and articulable suspicion is not required before a police officer may use a canine trained in drug detection to sniff the vehicle’s exterior .” Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied. Rogers , 253 Ga. App. 863, 864-865 1. See also McCray , 268 Ga. App. at 87 1.
