We granted certiorari from the holding in First National Bank of Ames, Iowa v. Innovative Clinical and Consulting Services, LLC. , 266 Ga. App. 842 598 SE2d 530 2004 to address perceived inconsistencies in our precedents defining the scope of personal jurisdiction that Georgia courts may exercise over nonresidents pursuant to OCGA § 9-10-91, the Georgia long-arm statute. We reiterate our holding in Gust v. Flint , 257 Ga. 129 356 SE2d 513 1987, that “the rule that controls is our statute, which requires that an out-of-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before he can be subjected to personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 130. However, because as set forth below we conclude that our earlier opinions have unduly limited the literal language of OCGA § 9-10-91, we reverse in part the holding of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further consideration by that court. OCGA § 9-10-91 provides in pertinent part that a court of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident . . ., as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in person or through an agent, he: 1 Transacts any business within this state;
2 Commits a tortious act or omission within this state . . . ; 3 Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state; . . . . Prior to our holding in Gust , this Court in Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson , 244 Ga. 300, 301 260 SE2d 9 1979 expanded subsection 2 to encompass nonresidents in those situations where the cause of action arising from injury in Georgia resulted from a tortious act or omission occurring outside this State, see also Shellenberger v. Tanner , 138 Ga. App. 399 2 227 SE2d 266 1976, holding that there was “no essential difference” between subsection 2 and 3. Clarkson Power Flow , supra at 301. Because subsection 2, unlike subsection 3, contained no explicit legislative limiting conditions, we held that subsection 2 was constrained only by, and thus was co-extensive with, the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp. , 230 Ga. 58, 61-62 195 SE2d 399 1973. See also First United Bank of Miss. v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta , 255 Ga. 505, 506 340 SE2d 597 1986. In Gust the Court rejected these cases and returned to a “literal construction” of OCGA § 9-10-91, Gust , supra, 257 Ga. at 130, thus holding that a nonresident “must do certain acts” as delineated by the statute before the nonresident could be subjected to personal jurisdiction in Georgia. Id. This holding reinstated the difference between subsections 2 and 3 established by the literal language of the statute. Thus, under subsection 2 a Georgia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tortious act or omission within this State,1 insofar as the exercise of that personal jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process; and under subsection 3 a Georgia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who commits a tortious injury in Georgia caused by an act or omission outside Georgia only if the tortfeasor “regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state,” notwithstanding that these limiting conditions may preclude a Georgia court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the nonresident to the fullest extent permitted by constitutional due process. Gust , supra.2
