A petition alleging deprivation was filed in February 2003 regarding I.S. and his twin sister, D.S., after one-month-old I.S. was found to have a broken left femur, a broken left fibula and another leg fracture that was in the healing stage. In an order filed May 8, 2003, the juvenile court of Fulton County found that the infants were deprived based on medical evidence adduced at an earlier hearing.1 At that time the court entered an order of disposition permitting the infants to remain with their parents hereinafter “appellants”, subject to conditions and limitations prescribed by the court, including supervision by the Department of Family and Children Services DFCS. See OCGA § 15-11-55 a 1. Although this order constituted a final order that could be directly appealed, see In the Interest of J. P. , 267 Ga. 492 480 SE2d 8 1997 and Sanchez v. Walker County DFACS , 235 Ga. 817 221 SE2d 589 1976, appellants did not appeal the ruling. Nor did they file a motion for new trial, see In the Interest of T.A.W. , 265 Ga. 106 454 SE2d 134 1995, or a motion pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-40 to modify or vacate the juvenile court’s order. At a review hearing conducted May 21, 2003, the court heard from the parties that appellants had complied with the conditions prescribed by the court and that the infants were “doing fine,” although the results of medical testing undertaken to determine if I.S. suffered from a genetic disorder proved inconclusive.2 DFCS recommended that the case be closed. The transcript of the hearing reflects that appellants expressly requested the court to “heed the advice of DFCS and formally close this matter” against them. The juvenile court orally announced that despite the absence of an explanation for I.S.’s injuries, it would accept DFCS’s recommendation to close out the matter in light of appellants’ behavior in cooperating with DFCS and diligently attending to their children’s medical needs. A written order reflecting the court’s findings was entered July 18, 2003.3
Notwithstanding their knowledge of the court’s intended ruling prior to the expiration of the 30-day period in which to file a notice of appeal from the May 8 finding of deprivation, OCGA § 5-6-38 a, appellants chose to wait until August 15, 2003 to file their appeal “from the Finding of Fact, Judgment and Disposition of the Juvenile Court of Fulton County entered on May 8, 2003, and further entered on July 18, 2003, whereby the Court found that said minor children were deprived.” Appellants’ three enumerations of error focused solely upon the juvenile court’s evidentiary finding that the infants were deprived.4 The Court of Appeals accurately recognized that appellants challenged only matters addressed in the May 8 deprivation order. That court then dismissed appellants’ appeal on the basis that it was untimely because the May 8 order was entered more than 30 days before the notice of appeal was filed. In the Interest of I.S. , 265 Ga. App 759 595 SE2d 528 2004. The Court of Appeals also found that the appeal had been rendered moot by appellants’ retaining custody and the case being closed by the trial court. Id. at 760. We granted appellants’ petition for certiorari and hold that although the Court of Appeals erred by finding appellants’ appeal to be untimely, it correctly determined that the appeal was moot. Accordingly, we affirm.
