Nancy Dickerson, a longtime employee of Augusta-Richmond County, became the Assistant Chief Appraiser of the Personal Property Section of the Tax Assessor’s Office. Thereafter, pursuant to the recommendation of the Board of Tax Assessors, the County Commission voted to require that the Chief Appraiser and all of the Assistant Chief Appraisers, including Ms. Dickerson, obtain an “Appraiser IV” certification in real estate appraisal in order to keep their positions. Ms. Dickerson failed to pass the necessary examination and to achieve that certification within the time allowed, which was two and one-half years, including extensions. Accordingly, she was demoted, her salary was decreased, and her request for reinstatement was denied. Ms. Dickerson brought suit for injunctive and declaratory relief against the Chief Appraiser, the members of the Board, and the Commissioners Appellants. After a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Appellants violated Ms. Dickerson’s constitutional right of equal protection by imposing on her an unreasonable and arbitrary requirement to obtain real estate appraisal certification which was unrelated to her position, when, unlike her, others on whom that requirement was imposed were involved in real estate appraisal and had already obtained higher certifications than she. The court declined to reinstate her, so as to avoid any harm to third parties and not to interfere with the management of the Tax Assessor’s Office, but it awarded her back pay and ordered that she receive the same compensation as the current Assistant Chief Tax Appraisers. We granted Appellants’ application for discretionary appeal because the judgment is otherwise directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 a 4. 1. Although the parties make a procedural due process argument in this Court, the trial court did not expressly address that issue below. The trial court based its holding on grounds of equal protection, not procedural due process. ” ‘We will not rule on a constitutional question unless it clearly appears in the record that the trial court distinctly ruled on the point cit..’ Cits.” Haynes v. Wells , 273 Ga. 106, 108 3 538 SE2d 430 2000. See also Pimper v. State of Ga. , 274 Ga. 624, 627 555 SE2d 459 2001; Chanin v. Bibb County , 234 Ga. 282, 292 5 216 SE2d 250 1975.
The trial court also did not rule on any issue of substantive due process. However, even assuming that the trial court’s order could be read as partially relying on that concept, such reliance would be wholly misplaced, since controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States ” ‘demonstrates that an employee with a property right in employment is protected only by the procedural component of the Due Process Clause, not its substantive component.’ Cits.” Angell v. Hart , 232 Ga. App. 222, 224 3 501 SE2d 594 1998. See also Wimberly, Ga. Employment Law § 7-20, p. 319 3rd ed. 2000.
