On March 20, 1996, Willie and Ruby Brown died in a fire in their Appling County, Georgia home. On March 4, 1997, an indictment was returned, charging appellant Littray Williams with burglary of the Brown residence on the day of the fire. At the time of the indictment, Williams was serving a two-year prison sentence for an unrelated drug conviction. While in prison on the drug conviction, he voluntarily implicated himself in the deaths of the Browns. As a result, a new indictment was returned in 1998 charging Williams with arson, malice murder two counts, armed robbery two counts, aggravated assault two counts, as well as the same burglary charge as contained in the 1997 indictment, and felony murder predicated on that burglary two counts. After the return of the 1998 indictment, the State served notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. In 2003 Williams filed a motion to dismiss the 1998 indictment on grounds that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion, and an appeal was taken to this Court. Williams v. State , 277 Ga. 598 592 SE2d 848 2004. We affirmed as to all offenses except the charge of burglary and the two felony murders predicated on the burglary. We noted that Williams had been indicted in 1997 for the same burglary offense, thus resulting in a one-year longer delay, and that the record was silent as to the reasons for that delay. Accordingly, we remanded for further proceedings on the issue of whether Williams’ constitutional right “to a speedy trial on the charge of burglary was denied and, if so, for additional consideration of how that denial affects the viability of Williams’ felony murder charges predicated on the alleged burglary.” Id. at 598.
On remand, the trial court entered an order reassessing its constitutional speedy trial analysis by factoring in the additional one-year delay as measured from the time of the 1997 indictment.1 After acknowledging that the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the trial court evaluated the constitutional claim, as it must, under the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972, assessing the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. The court concluded that the presumptive prejudice from the passage of time is overcome by other factors which must be weighed against defendant, that the prosecution of the burglary offense and the two felony murders predicated on burglary is not barred on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds, and that it is unnecessary to consider a double jeopardy issue. Williams appealed Case No. S04A1737.
