Appellant Willie Franklin appeals from her misdemeanor conviction for creating a nuisance due to an accumulation of refuse on her property, arguing that the county ordinance at issue is unconstitutionally vague. Having considered this argument, we conclude that, when measured by common understanding and practices, the ordinance provides sufficient notice as to the conduct it prohibits so that persons of common intelligence need neither guess at its meaning nor differ as to its applications. Therefore, we reject appellant’s vagueness challenge. Having considered appellant’s other arguments and found them to be without merit, we affirm. Due to an accumulation of refuse on her property that included among other things used tires, rusted lawnmowers, discarded rain gutters, scrap lumber, used pallets, old cans, scrap metal, broken lawn chairs, baby buggies, garbage, shopping carts, foam insulation and a discarded kitchen sink, appellant was cited for violating section 46-61 d of the Cherokee County Code of Ordinances, which provides that: Any accumulation of litter or rubbish items on any lot, property, premises, public street, alley, or other public or private place not permitted by this chapter is hereby declared to be a nuisance. Failure of the owner or occupant to remove and correct any such accumulation of refuse after appropriate notice from the board of commissioners or its designee shall raise the presumption that such person intended to violate this chapter. As she does on appeal, appellant argued before the trial court that section 46-61 d should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague. The trial court rejected that argument, and a jury trial was held. Appellant was convicted of violating section 46-61 d, received a probated sentence and was fined.
1. A statute or ordinance is unconstitutionally vague only if it fails to convey “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices,”1 so that “persons of common intelligence need not necessarily guess at its meaning nor differ as to its application.”2 In general, any word or phrase used in an ordinance that has a commonly understood meaning is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process requirements, and thus is not considered vague.3
