A DeKalb County jury convicted Cedric Caldwell of two counts of aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21 a 2, and one count of aggravated battery, OCGA § 16-5-24.1 He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial. Finding no error, we affirm. 1. Caldwell, who represented himself at trial, contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it found he had voluntarily and knowingly waived his right to counsel. “While a criminal defendant has an absolute right to counsel in any prosecution which could result in imprisonment, the accused also has a fundamental right to represent himself in a state criminal trial when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Citation and punctuation omitted. Clarke v. Zant , 247 Ga. 194, 195 275 SE2d 49 1981. In order to establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel, a trial judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. To be valid, such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter. When determining whether there has been an informed and intelligent waiver of such a right, each case must be determined upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances. . . . When a defendant challenges an alleged waiver of the right to counsel on appeal, it is the State’s burden to prove that the defendant received sufficient information and guidance from the trial court upon which to knowingly and intelligently relinquish this right. Citations and punctuation omitted. Hamilton v. State , 233 Ga. App. 463, 466-467 1 b 504 SE2d 236 1998.
The record in this case shows that Caldwell was tried in June 2002 on three counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated battery arising from the shooting of two men during a drug deal. Caldwell testified at trial and claimed that an acquaintance was present at the scene and was the man who shot the victims. The jury acquitted Caldwell of one count of aggravated assault, but deadlocked on the three remaining charges, leading to a mistrial on those charges. In October 2003, the State retried Caldwell on the remaining charges. Before the second trial, the court appointed a different defense attorney to represent Caldwell. Immediately after the case was called for the second trial, defense counsel told the court that Caldwell wanted to proceed with his trial pro se. Counsel stated that he had explained to Caldwell the risks of self-representation, but that Caldwell was “adamant” about proceeding pro se. When the court asked Caldwell if he wanted to represent himself, Caldwell responded, “Yes, sir.” The trial court then explained the difficulties and potential consequences of going to trial without counsel and strongly advised Caldwell against doing so. Despite the court’s warnings, Caldwell repeatedly and emphatically told the court that he wanted to represent himself. He stated that he wanted the court to dismiss his current appointed counsel, but did not give a reason. Caldwell never asked for another appointed counsel or for a continuance to allow him to hire an attorney. The court informed Caldwell of the crimes for which he was being tried, the potential sentences he could receive if convicted, the effect of his status as a recidivist on his eligibility for parole, possible defenses, and the fact that there would probably be no lesser-included offenses to the crimes as charged. After hearing this information, Caldwell reaffirmed that he wanted to proceed pro se. The court warned Caldwell that it would apply the same rules to the trial regardless whether Caldwell represented himself or was represented by an attorney. The court also offered to have Caldwell’s counsel available to provide assistance during the trial, but Caldwell refused the offer. Even so, the court asked counsel to remain in the courtroom for part of the trial as an observer in case Caldwell changed his mind about representing himself. Caldwell then argued several motions to the court, including motions to exclude similar transaction evidence, exclude improper character evidence, and suppress his custodial statements. The court advised Caldwell that he would rule on the admissibility of the challenged evidence as the trial progressed.
