David MacDonald sued Jo Ann Whipple to enforce a contract to purchase real estate. Although the property in question was co-owned by Whipple and her brother, Whipple forged her brother’s signature on the sales contract in her attempt to sell the entire property to MacDonald. The trial court found that the contract was unenforceable and accordingly granted summary judgment to Whipple on MacDonald’s claim to enforce it. MacDonald claims that this ruling was erroneous and that summary judgment should have instead been granted in his favor. We disagree and affirm. On appeal from the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the law and evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holbrook v. Stansell , 254 Ga. App. 553, 553-554 562 SE2d 731 2002.
So viewed, the relevant evidence reveals that Whipple owned a fifty percent interest in certain property, with her brother owning the other fifty percent. MacDonald agreed to buy the entire property with knowledge of this co-ownership. MacDonald made no attempt to contact Whipple’s brother, and only dealt with Whipple during the course of the purported sale. When MacDonald signed a sales contract that was intended to convey the entire property to him, both Whipple’s signature as well as what appeared to be the signature of her brother had already been affixed to the sales contract. Although MacDonald did not know it at the time, Whipple had forged her brother’s signature on the sales contract without his knowledge. See MacDonald v. Harris , 265 Ga. App. 131, 133 2 593 SE2d 32 2003 affirming grant of summary judgment to Whipple’s brother on MacDonald’s claim to enforce same real estate sales contract at issue in this case because the brother had not ratified the agreement.
