Jack Townsend was injured when his vehicle was struck head-on by a car operated by William Serio. At the time of the collision, Serio was driving home from the Atlanta airport, where he had arrived on a Delta Airlines Delta flight from Milwaukee. Alleging that Serio became intoxicated by the consumption of wine served to him while on that flight, Townsend filed a tort action against him and Delta in the Superior Court of Fulton County. The claim against Delta was based upon the Georgia Dram Shop Act GDSA, OCGA § 51-1-40, and common law negligence. Asserting federal preemption, Delta removed the case to federal court. The district court concluded that there was no federal claim and no federal preemption of any state cause of action, and remanded the case to the superior court. After remand, Delta moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted Delta’s motion, holding that the air carrier was not subject to state tort liability for supplying alcohol to a passenger on an interstate flight. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of Townsend’s common law negligence claim, but reversed as to the claim based upon the GDSA. The Court of Appeals held that, “surely, the Georgia legislature intended our dram shop statute to apply in these circumstances. Cits.” Townsend v. Delta Airlines , 269 Ga. App. 645, 648 1 605 SE2d 54 2004. Delta applied for certiorari, which we granted to review the holding of the Court of Appeals that Townsend stated a viable claim for recovery under the GDSA.
1. “At common law there was no right of recovery for selling or furnishing intoxicating liquor to an intoxicated person. Cit.” Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis , 70 Ga. App. 379, 385-386 1 28 SE2d 329 1943. ” ‘ “ The common-law rule holds the man who drank the liquor liable and considers the act of selling it as too remote to be a proximate cause of an injury caused by the negligent act of the purchaser of the drink.” ‘ ” Keaton v. Kroger Co. , 143 Ga. App. 23, 26 327 SE2d 443 1977. Thus, so long as the common-law rule is adhered to, it matters not whether the act of furnishing liquor may be considered as simple negligence or as negligence per se in violation of the criminal statute —it cannot, alone, leap the common law’s chasm of causation. Cits. This is why the violation of liquor laws cannot be analogized to other types of negligence per se, and why legislation is required which directly imposes liability in derogation of the common law.” Keaton v. Kroger Co. , supra at 27.
