This case involves the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-5-22 c 2 and 7. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that the Department of Motor Vehicle Safety shall not issue any driver’s license to nor renew the driver’s license of any person: . . . 2 Whose license is currently under suspension or revocation in any other jurisdiction upon grounds which would authorize the suspension or revocation of a license under this chapter; . . . 7 Whose license issued by any other jurisdiction is suspended or revoked by such other jurisdiction during the period such license is suspended or revoked by such other jurisdiction. While residing in Georgia during the years 1979-1981, appellant William J. Roberts, Jr. was convicted three times of driving under the influence. After he was declared an habitual violator in Georgia, he moved to Florida and became a Florida resident. In 1985 he obtained a Florida driver’s license. In 1987 he was convicted of driving under the influence in Florida and pursuant to Florida law his driver’s license was permanently revoked. Appellant moved back to Georgia in 1991 and obtained a Georgia driver’s license. He was convicted of DUI in 1992 and 1997. Although appellant obtained one renewal of his Georgia driver’s license, in 2001 the DMVS refused to reissue the license pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-22 c 2 and 7. After appellant’s attempts to obtain reinstatement of his Florida license failed, he administratively challenged the DMVS’s decision on the ground, inter alia, that OCGA § 40-5-22 c 2 and 7 violated his equal protections rights. Appellant’s challenge to the statute failed both at the administrative level and before the superior court. We granted his application for discretionary appeal and affirm the superior court for the reasons that follow. 1. “A statute attacked as unconstitutional is presumed by the judiciary to be constitutional cit. until it is established that the statute ‘manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision or violates the rights of the people. . . .’ Cit.” Love v. State , 271 Ga. 398, 400 2 517 SE2d 53 1999. Appellant contends that subsections 2 and 7 of OCGA § 40-5-22 c violate his equal protection rights because the subsections single him out for treatment different from that afforded to every other Georgia resident seeking a driver’s license who has been convicted four or more times in a lifetime for DUI. We reject appellant’s argument because it is based on a mischaracterization of the class affected by the statute. OCGA § 40-5-22 c 2 applies to those persons who were formerly issued licenses by another jurisdiction and thereafter had their licenses revoked on grounds that would authorize that revocation under Georgia law. Such persons are not similarly situated to Georgia residents who have never incurred the revocation of a license issued by a foreign jurisdiction. Although the class of persons affected by OCGA § 40-5-22 c 2 later become Georgia residents and apply for Georgia driver’s licenses, their history in the foreign jurisdiction distinguishes them from Georgia residents lacking a negative out-of-state driving record.
This analysis is not changed by the factual twist present in this case, i.e., that appellant, despite the revocation of his Florida license, was issued a Georgia driver’s license when he returned to Georgia. The issuance of that license was error as it clearly contravened the provisions in OCGA § 40-5-22 c. In light of that error and the uncontradicted evidence of appellant’s out-of-state driving record, appellant’s status as a Georgia resident issued a Georgia driver’s license after the revocation of his Florida license does not make him similarly situated to Georgia drivers whose Georgia licenses are revoked for four or more DUI convictions.
