This case, once appearing before the Supreme Court and now appearing before this Court for the fifth time, arises out of an early morning shooting on December 17, 1995, at the Gate Restaurant and Lounge, a nightclub located in Decatur, Georgia. Random shots were fired in the midst of a melee in the club’s parking lot, one of which hit appellee-plaintiff Ronald Ross in the stomach as he was attempting to leave the club. On March 25, 1997, Ross and his mother, appellee-plaintiff Shirley Ross, filed their complaint for damages against the club, Jeff Akhtar and others, alleging, among other things, negligence for providing inadequate security, failure to warn, and lost services to Ms. Ross. The DeKalb County Superior Court entered its final judgment on the Ross’ negligence claims against Akhtar, who filed bankruptcy, by consent on June 29, 1999, awarding them $500,000. Akhtar’s insurer, appellant-defendant St. Paul Reinsurance Company, Inc., had informed Akhtar that it would neither defend him in the action nor indemnify him for any damages in light of the assault and battery exclusion of his reinsurance policy of insurance before the superior court entered its consent judgment. On August 11, 1999, the Rosses filed their affidavit of garnishment against St. Paul in the State Court of DeKalb County “state court” or “garnishment court”. St. Paul timely answered, and on January 31, 2000, moved for summary judgment for want of insurance coverage, again relying upon the assault and battery exclusion of Akhtar’s reinsurance policy. On June 13, 2000, the state court entered its amended order on garnishment, finding as follows: the damages for which the insured defendant, Jeff Akhtar, became liable in this case were not excluded from the garnishee’s insurance policy. THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiffs’ garnishment is GRANTED; Garnishee is directed to pay the limits of its policy pursuant to the judgment issued by the superior court on June 29, 1999. We granted St. Paul’s application for discretionary review on August 7, 2000, but remanded the case to the state court without reaching the merits upon finding that the Rosses “may lack standing to assert a garnishment action, citing Metropolitan Prop &c. Co. v. Crump , 237 Ga. App. 96 513 SE2d 33 1999. On January 25, 2002, we dismissed St. Paul’s direct appeal from the state court’s order entered on December 13, 2001, which found standing in the Rosses to sue St. Paul as the garnishee reinsurance company —dismissal as proper because the underlying action was garnishment as to which an application for discretionary review was required and our remand order made no provision for refiling the appeal by notice of appeal. In addition to finding that the Rosses had standing to bring their action in garnishment “after an order remains unsatisfied,” the state court’s December 13 order and a corrected order thereon entered January 30, 2002, nunc pro tunc to June 13, 2000, stated, “What amount can be garnished and the ‘limits’ of the policy is unestablished. Any amounts above the ‘policy limit’ is sic not authorized by OCGA § 18-6-40.” On February 5, 2002, we re-entered St. Paul’s appeal from the state court’s December 13, 2000 order on motion for reconsideration as in aid of our jurisdiction under Article VI, Section I, Paragraph IV of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. The Rosses sought reconsideration, and, on March 11, 2002, we vacated such order, citing Davidson v. Callaway , 274 Ga. 813 559 SE2d 728 2002. Therein, our Supreme Court held: There is no exception to the requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 that excuses an appellant from following the discretionary appeal procedures merely because the ruling being appealed was issued by the trial court on remand rather than on its first appearance in the trial court. In matters arising from garnishment, the filing of a previous application for discretionary appeal does not relieve an appellant from following the statutory appeal procedures for all subsequent issues sought to be appealed arising from that same matter. Citation omitted. Id. at 815. St. Paul’s petition for certiorari was denied.
Following the second remand of the case, the Rosses sent St. Paul a letter dated July 15, 2002, demanding payment in the amount of $482,560.65. The next day, St. Paul responded by its letter refusing payment and informing the Rosses that the state court’s order of June 13, 2000, was not a final judgment upon which execution could issue for want of an amount certain stated therein.1 On August 7, 2002, the Rosses filed a motion for contempt. The state court heard the motion on October 4, 2002, St. Paul, among other things, arguing no duty to pay in the absence of a final judgment. On April 18, 2003, the state court entered an order finding its June 13, 2000 “order to be ‘final,’ in that the ‘policy limits’ as referred to in that order does mean the limit of Garnishee’s liability in that policy or $300,000.” And, on May 14, 2003, by its order styled “Order on Motion for Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt,” the state court ordered St. Paul to “pay instanter to the Rosses $300,000 the policy limits in question, $102,000 interest from the date of the June 13, 2000 order to date for a total sum of $402,000.”
