Kathleen Strykr filed a pro se petition asking the trial court to permanently enjoin and strike as unconstitutional the amendments to Long County’s solid waste services ordinance that authorized the County to enter into a contract with a private enterprise, Sullivan Environmental Services SES, for the provision of garbage collection services to all residences in the unincorporated areas of the County and for the collection by SES of fees for these services on behalf of the County. The amended ordinance establishes mandatory curbside service and requires all residents to pay SES directly for the curbside collection.1 After a hearing the trial court denied Strykr’s petition. Finding no error, we affirm. 1. Strykr asserts the trial court’s ruling was error because the contract authorized by the ordinance at issue defeats or lessens competition and thus is unlawful and void under Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. V c of the State Constitution and 15 USCA § 1-3 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Assuming, arguendo, that Strykr has standing to raise this issue and it is properly before this Court, it is well established that local governmental entities are immune from antitrust laws when engaged in anticompetitive conduct pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire , 471 U.S. 34 II 105 SC 1713, 85 LE2d 24 1985. We agree with the Commissioners that the alleged anticompetitive conduct here, i.e., entering into a contract with a private contractor to provide curbside solid waste collection to all residents of unincorporated Long County, was conduct expressly contemplated by the State in the enactment of the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act, OCGA § 12-8-20 et seq. Because the County’s actions were pursuant to state policy, Strykr’s claims based on Georgia antitrust laws are likewise without merit. OCGA § § 36-65-1, -2.
2. Strykr argues that the solid waste collection fee authorized by the ordinance constitutes a tax imposed in violation of Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution because a resident’s failure to pay the collection fee may result in a lien being placed on the resident’s property. However, this Court has recognized that such sanitation assessments “are not taxes within the meaning of our Constitution but rather charges for services rendered by the county. Cits.” Levetan v. Lanier Worldwide , 265 Ga. 323, 324 2 454 SE2d 504 1995. Counties that provide solid waste collection services are authorized to enforce by ordinance the collection of fees “in the same manner as authorized by law for the enforcement of the collection and payment of state taxes, fees, or assessments.” OCGA § 12-8-39.3 a. Accordingly, we find no merit in Strykr’s argument.
