These appeals arise out of the trial court’s order denying summary judgment to the defendants in a legal malpractice case but granting the defendants’ motion in limine. The effect of the trial court’s order was to prohibit the plaintiffs from introducing expert testimony related to the issue of whether, but for the defendants’ negligence, the plaintiffs would have prevailed in their underlying medical malpractice action. Although we conclude that the trial court correctly denied summary judgment to the defendant-attorneys, we also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion in limine. Rita and James Blackwell filed a medical malpractice action against Shirley Goodwin, a nurse, and others alleging that Goodwin improperly administered an injection to Rita Blackwell. The alleged injury occurred on April 15, 1991. Thomas C. Blaska filed the action in March 1993 and represented the Blackwells for more than four years. Upon mutual agreement between the Blackwells and Blaska in August 1996, Blaska withdrew from representation.1 The Blackwells subsequently retained defendants James Hugh Potts II and Shandor S. Badaruddin and their law firm, who entered an appearance in the medical malpractice case in November 1996. The case was stipulated to the next available trial calendar, which was scheduled for January 6, 1997. On January 2, 1997, on behalf of the Blackwells, Potts and Badaruddin filed a motion for continuance and to specially set the case for trial, on the ground that they needed more time to secure the attendance of certain named expert witnesses. They also moved “to extend or reopen the period during which the court’s compulsory process may be invoked to compel discovery.”
The trial court held a pretrial conference on January 8, at which Potts announced not ready for trial and again requested a continuance and leave to reopen discovery. The trial court denied the motions. The court instructed Potts that he could try the case, settle it, or agree to have the case placed on the inactive docket for 90 days. According to Potts’s affidavit later submitted in support of a motion to set aside, the trial court “further advised that she understood new counsel had been recently retained, but that if the case was not ready for trial they should ‘dismiss and refile so that you can get your ducks in a row.’ ” The parties did not settle the case, and defense counsel objected to placing the case on the inactive docket. Potts and Badaruddin followed the trial court’s suggestion. They dismissed the case and refiled it March 5, 1997.
