In this disciplinary proceeding, the State Bar filed a formal complaint against Dietrich W. Oellerich, Jr., alleging that he violated Standard 30 of former Bar Rule 4-102 d. The special master granted summary judgment in favor of the State Bar, and recommended that Oellerich be suspended from the practice of law. The Review Panel of the State Disciplinary Board adopted the special master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but recommended disbarment as the appropriate sanction. The Report and Recommendation of the Review Panel is now before this Court for our consideration. At issue are actions undertaken by Oellerich during his legal representation of the executor of an estate. In 1994, the estate loaned $120,000 to Southern Joy, a statutory close corporation in which Oellerich was the sole shareholder. The loan, which represented approximately one-third of the estate’s total assets, was evidenced by a promissory note, executed by Oellerich’s wife in her capacity as president and chief executive officer of Southern Joy. The instrument contained terms very favorable to the corporation and, at Oellerich’s insistence, was not secured by any property or personal guaranty. Ultimately, Southern Joy defaulted on the note. In 1998, Oellerich filed for bankruptcy protection, and listed the loan to Southern Joy as an unsecured debt. In 2000, the debt evidenced by the note was discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Standard 30 of former Bar Rule 4-102 d provides that, except with the written consent or written notice to his client after full disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests. By using the estate as a source of funds for the loan to Southern Joy, Oellerich clearly engaged in a transaction wherein his professional judgment on behalf of the executor was or reasonably could have been affected by his own personal, financial, property or professional interests. In his defense, Oellerich contends that the executor’s signature on the loan check from the estate to Southern Joy, coupled with the acceptance of the corporate promissory note, constitutes the client’s requisite written consent to the potential conflict.
