Appellant Parthenia Johnson is the mother of a fifteen-year-old child who died due to accidental electrocution in 1995 while living at Broken Shackles Ranch pursuant to a placement agreement with the Georgia Department of Human Resources DHR and the Department of Juvenile Justice DJJ, in whose custody the Juvenile Court of Douglas County had placed the child. In her capacity as the mother of the deceased child and as the administratrix of his estate, Ms. Johnson filed a lawsuit seeking damages for wrongful death and pain and suffering against DHR, DJJ, and Broken Shackle. A jury returned a $3,000,000 verdict in favor of Ms. Johnson. After judgment was entered on that verdict, DHR and DJJ filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals contending the trial court erred when it denied motions to dismiss and for directed verdict based on sovereign immunity immunizing DHR and DJJ from suit. In a whole-court decision, the Court of Appeals unanimously concluded sovereign immunity had not been waived by the State and reversed the entry of judgment against DHR and DJJ. DHR v. Johnson , 264 Ga. App. 730 592 SE2d 124 2003. We granted Ms. Johnson’s petition for a writ of certiorari to examine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding DHR and DJJ were immune from suit. 1. As noted by the Court of Appeals, under the Georgia Constitution, the sovereign immunity of the State may be waived only as provided by the Legislature in a tort claims act or an act of the Legislature which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is waived and sets forth the extent of such waiver. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX a, e; Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Bd. , 273 Ga. 715 2 545 SE2d 875 2001; DHR v. Johnson , supra, 264 Ga. App. at 731-733. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Georgia Tort Claims Act waives the State’s sovereign immunity for the torts of state employees while acting within the scope of their employment and that GTCA’s statutory definition of “employee,” which includes foster parents and excludes corporations and independent contractors doing business with the State, keeps Broken Shackle from being an employee of the State since it is a corporation. Id., at 734; OCGA § 50-21-23a, § 50-21-227.
2. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that, even if Broken Shackle were an unincorporated independent contractor, DHR and DJJ could not be held liable for the negligence of an employee of Broken Shackle under OCGA § 51-2-5, which holds employers liable for the negligence of contractors in certain instances, because § 51-2-5 cannot act as a waiver of sovereign immunity since it does not contain statutory language “which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.” 1983 Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX e. Dept. of Human Resources v. Johnson , supra, 264 Ga. App. at 734. The Court of Appeals then repeated its concern, first voiced in Williams v. Dept. of Corrections , 224 Ga. App. 571, 575 481 SE2d 272 1997, that the State “should be responsible for its ‘duty to protect the safety and health of state inmates’ and that it should not ‘be relieved of this duty by employing independent contractors,’ ” but deemed itself without authority to address this issue. DHR v. Johnson , supra, 264 Ga. App. at 736.
