A Special Purpose Local Option Sales Tax SPLOST was approved in a special referendum in Douglas County for the purpose of providing recreational facilities and roadway improvements. The Douglas County Board of Commissioners Board elected to finance these improvements by the issuance of revenue bonds. The Development Authority of Douglas County Authority authorized the bond financing and entered into an intergovernmental contract with the Board which obligated the County to repay the bonds from SPLOST proceeds or, if there was a shortfall, from any lawfully available funds. A bond validation proceeding was instituted, followed by the requisite publication of notice, and a final order authorizing the issuance was entered. No person filed any motion to intervene in that proceeding or appealed from the validation order. One and one-half years later, James Quarterman, acting pro se, filed petitions against the Board members in their official capacities and against the Authority Appellees for a temporary restraining order and for writs of prohibition and mandamus, seeking to restrain the SPLOST collection for repayment of the revenue bonds, to prohibit the trial court from relying on its prior approval of the bond validation, and to require Appellees to vacate the bond project and to have the bonds legally issued. Appellees moved to dismiss all claims. After a hearing, the trial court denied all relief and granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Quarterman could not collaterally attack the judgment of validation and that the intergovernmental contract was constitutionally authorized. Quarterman appealed from this order. The Georgia Constitution of 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Par. IV “requires the General Assembly to provide for ‘incontestable and conclusive’ validation of revenue bonds. Cit.” Ambac Indemnity Corp. v. Akridge , 262 Ga. 773 1 425 SE2d 637 1993. The General Assembly so provided by enacting the following statute: If no appeal is filed within the time prescribed by law or if an appeal is filed and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, the judgment of the superior court confirming and validating the issuance of the bonds and the security therefor shall be forever conclusive against the governmental body upon the validity of such bonds and the security therefor. OCGA § 36-82-78. “This court has held consistently that this statutory provision prevents any collateral attack by the county, county residents, or taxpayers who had proper notice of the validation proceedings but chose not to intervene. Cits.” Ambac Indemnity Corp. v. Akridge , supra at 774 1.
The record reveals that Quarterman had both actual knowledge and statutory notice of the validation proceeding, and he does not contend otherwise. See Ambac Indemnity Corp. v. Akridge , supra; Charlton Development Auth. v. Charlton County , 253 Ga. 208, 209 317 SE2d 204 1984. Instead, he urges that the trial court erroneously denied his request to intervene in the validation proceeding without motion pursuant to OCGA § 36-82-77. However, the record does not contain such request or the denial thereof and, more importantly, Quarterman did not attempt to appeal from either the denial of intervention or from the validation judgment. See Kipp v. Rawson , 193 Ga. App. 532, 535 4 a 388 SE2d 409 1989. Compare Hay v. Development Auth. of Walton County , 239 Ga. App. 803 521 SE2d 912 1999. Had he so appealed and obtained a reversal, he could have raised on remand those issues regarding the bonds and the contract which he now argues in this Court, and he could have appealed from any subsequent adverse judgment in the trial court. Charlton Development Auth. v. Charlton County , supra; Hay v. Development Auth. of Walton County , supra at 805. Quarterman’s complete failure to appeal from any order in the validation proceeding also precludes his claim, unsupported in the record, that the trial court erred in informing him that a $4.2 million surety bond would be required within ten days in order to appeal. See Turpen v. Rabun County Bd. of Commissioners , 251 Ga. App. 505, 507, fn. 11 554 SE2d 727 2001. Compare Haney v. Development Auth. of Bremen , 271 Ga. 403, 405 1 519 SE2d 665 1999.
