Elmore Copeland was found guilty by a Clayton County jury of two counts of forgery. After this court affirmed his conviction in Copeland v. State , 248 Ga. App. 346 546 SE2d 351 2001, he filed a motion to correct a void sentence, which the trial court denied. Copeland’s motion for an out-of-time appeal from that order was denied; in Copeland v. State , 264 Ga. App. 905 592 SE2d 540 2003, we reversed that decision, and this appeal followed. Copeland, appearing pro se, argues that the State failed to give notice of its intent to present evidence in aggravation of punishment and that the trial court erred in considering two of his prior convictions for sentencing purposes. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 1. Copeland first argues that the State failed to give proper notice of its intent to use his prior convictions as evidence in aggravation. But, as Copeland’s trial counsel apparently acknowledged, the record contains several copies of the State’s notice of intent to seek recidivist punishment under OCGA § 17-10-7. While one copy was filed in open court on April 26, apparently “during the opening proceedings,” another copy was filed two days earlier.1 This notice was sufficient under OCGA § 17-10-2 a. Moss v. State , 206 Ga. App. 310, 312 5 425 SE2d 386 1992. Moreover, while Copeland relies on Queen v. State , 131 Ga. App. 370 4 205 SE2d 921 1974, “any holding in Queen that notice on the day of trial is insufficient compliance with the statute has been obviated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Corbett v. State , 233 Ga. 756 213 SE2d 652 1975.” Citation omitted. Williams v. State , 162 Ga. App. 120 2 290 SE2d 341 1982.
2. Copeland also contends that the trial court erred in considering for sentencing purposes his earlier convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault, because those convictions formed the basis of his earlier prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Relying on King v. State , 169 Ga. App. 444 313 SE2d 144 1984, he argues that once those felony convictions were employed as the basis for a prosecution under OCGA § 16-11-131, they were “used up” and can no longer be employed for any purpose, including aggravation of punishment under OCGA § 17-10-7 in a later prosecution. This argument is incorrect.
