Coquitta Byrd was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which charge arose after Byrd allegedly stabbed a girl in the neck with a knife. The State appeals from both an order of the Superior Court of Fulton County granting Byrd’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy trial and an order of that same court granting Byrd’s motion to suppress the identification testimony of the victim. Finding no basis in fact and law for either of the trial court’s judgments, we reverse. Because the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is “a constitutional right the deprivation of which can work to the advantage of the defendant, a trial court’s ruling on the subject must be carefully scrutinized.”1 In that regard, the record before us is small, and the transcript of the hearing on the motion to dismiss contains no evidence, only oral argument. This makes scrutiny difficult, but all the more important. What evidence of record there is shows that, after the stabbing incident in August of 1999, a warrant was issued for Byrd’s arrest. Byrd turned herself into the police a year later, August 29, 2000, and was arrested. She made bond two days later and has remained out on bond to the present. On December 22, 2000, four months after her arrest, Byrd was indicted.
Approximately two months later, on March 9, 2000, attorney Rodney Zell made an entry of appearance on Byrd’s behalf. The case was placed on a trial calendar for June 15, 2001. For an unknown cause, the case was re-set. Mr. Zell then filed for a leave of absence that encompassed weeks in both July and August of 2001. Thereafter, Mr. Zell moved to withdraw as Byrd’s counsel, which motion was granted by the court on September 20, 2001.
