Vinson Kinchen appeals the denial of his motion for discharge and acquittal on the ground of double jeopardy. The underlying facts, which were stipulated by the parties, show that Kinchen was arrested in Dougherty County after he attempted to sell approximately six pounds of marijuana to an undercover police officer. After the arrest, officers in Lee County, where Kinchen lived, obtained a search warrant for his home. Lee County officers discovered twelve pounds of marijuana in Kinchen’s home. Kinchen was charged in Dougherty County on a multi-count indictment, including possession with intent to distribute the marijuana he attempted to sell to the officer there. He pled guilty to the possession with intent to distribute charge and was sentenced. Approximately six months later, Kinchen was indicted in Lee County for possession with intent to distribute the twelve pounds of marijuana discovered in the search of his home. He filed his motion asserting that double jeopardy attached to the Lee County prosecution as a result of his guilty plea in Dougherty County. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The Georgia Constitution also contains a double jeopardy clause which provides that “no person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense.” Ga. Const., 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII. Further, OCGA § § 16-1-6, 16-1-7, and 16-1-8 also provide limitations on multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal conduct. Citation and punctuation omitted. Nolen v. State , 218 Ga. App. 819, 820 463 SE2d 504 1995.
Kinchen appears to rely upon the principle of substantive double jeopardy, which “precludes multiple convictions or punishments for crimes arising from the same criminal conduct. This limitation, which is codified at OCGA § 16-1-7 a, precludes conviction or punishment for more than one crime if one is included in the other as a matter of law or fact.” Citations omitted. Teal v. State , 203 Ga. App. 440, 441 1 417 SE2d 666 1992.1 See also OCGA § 16-1-8 a prosecution barred if accused “formerly prosecuted for the same crime based upon the same material facts.” Kinchen contends that his “act of possessing the marijuana with intent to distribute was one continuous transaction.” We disagree.
