On March 6, 1998, Littray Williams was indicted on two counts of malice murder, one count of arson, two counts of armed robbery, one count of burglary, two counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of felony murder with burglary serving as the underlying alleged felony. Those charges were brought in connection with the March 20, 1996, deaths of Willie and Ruby Brown. The State has given notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part the trial court’s order, filed on June 13, 2003, in which it concluded that Williams had not been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial as to the two counts of malice murder, the one count of arson, the two counts of armed robbery, and the two counts of aggravated assault. However, as it appears from our review of the record that Williams was previously indicted on March 4, 1997, for the same burglary alleged in his 1998 indictment, we remand this case in part for further proceedings in the trial court on the issue of whether Williams’s right to a speedy trial on the charge of burglary was denied and, if so, for additional consideration of how that denial affects the viability of Williams’s felony murder charges predicated on the alleged burglary. 1. In this appeal, Williams raises a constitutional speedy trial claim rather than a statutory speedy trial claim. See OCGA § 17-7-171 statutory procedure for demanding a speedy trial. In examining an alleged denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, courts must engage in a balancing test with the following factors being considered: 1 the length of the delay; 2 the reasons for the delay; 3 the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and 4 prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972. The existence of no one factor is either necessary or sufficient to sustain a speedy trial claim, and a trial court’s findings of fact and its weighing of disputed facts will be afforded deference on appeal. State v. Redding , 274 Ga. 831, 832 4 531 SE2d 79 2002; State v. Johnson , 274 Ga. 511, 514-515 555 SE2d 710 2001.
a. The relevant time period in a speedy trial claim begins with the earlier of the date of indictment and the date of arrest. Boseman v. State , 263 Ga. 730, 731 1 438 SE2d 626 1994. Accordingly, the trial court erred in calculating the length of the delay in bringing Williams to trial on the charges other than burglary by basing its calculation on the date of Williams’s arrest in April of 1998 rather than the date of his March 1998 indictment. Nevertheless, our review of the trial court’s order is not substantially altered by this error, because the difference in time involved amounts to only 27 days of the more than 61 months of delay beginning with Williams’s March 1998 indictment. We agree with the trial court that such a delay is so extraordinarily long as to be considered presumptively prejudicial and to require the consideration of the remaining factors in the balancing test. Boseman , 263 Ga. at 732 1 a.
