The Superior Court of Richmond County denied Larry Paul’s plea in bar, rejecting Paul’s claim that a retrial on charges of aggravated assault and possession of a knife was barred by double jeopardy. Paul appeals, reasserting his double jeopardy argument. Finding no error, we affirm. Because a trial court sits as the factfinder when ruling on a plea of double jeopardy, the appellate court will uphold its resolution of factual issues unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Thomas , 275 Ga. 167, 168 562 SE2d 501 2002. “A trial court’s findings of fact will not be deemed to be clearly erroneous if there is any evidence to support them, and this holds true even if the findings are based upon circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow from them.” Id.
At his first trial, the evidence showed that Paul stabbed another man in a bar, causing severe injuries. See Paul v. State, 240 Ga. App. 699, 699-700 524 SE2d 549 1999, reversed, Paul v. State , 272 Ga. 845, 849 3 537 SE2d 58 2000. Paul asserted two affirmative defenses: self-defense and insanity, specifically “post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from his combat service in Vietnam.” 240 Ga. App. at 699-700. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Paul’s petition for writ of certiorari and reversed Paul’s conviction based on the trial judge’s violation of OCGA § 17-8-57. Paul v. State , 272 Ga. at 849 3. The Supreme Court concluded the trial judge “took a prosecutorial role in the trial of the case, and intimated his opinion as to the credibility of witnesses and the guilt of the defendant.” Id. at 846 1. The Supreme Court cited several exchanges between the trial judge and various witnesses, such as when the trial judge questioned an expert defense witness “in such a way as to point out that post-traumatic stress disorder, a key component of defendant’s psychiatric defense, can be faked,” and also to suggest that Paul’s suicide attempts had been insincere. Id. at 846-848 1. As the Supreme Court held, the trial judge crossed the line when he questioned defendant’s experts about post-traumatic stress syndrome and attempted suicide. In each of those instances, the trial judge effectively disparaged defendant’s psychiatric defense and intimated that he gave it no credence whatsoever. It follows that the trial judge violated OCGA § 17-8-57. The jury easily could have interpreted the trial judge’s remarks as an expression of opinion on the issues to be decided in the case. Extreme anxiety to develop the truth as to facts which, if proved, will be peculiarly beneficial to one of the parties in the case and correspondingly detrimental to the other can easily be mistaken by the jury for a manifestation of the judge’s conviction that one party rather than the other should prevail. Id. at 848 1.
