When Juan Lindsey was arrested for various traffic offenses, the officer impounded his vehicle. During a search of the car, a loaded pistol was found in the pocket of the door on the passenger side. Lindsey was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of subsection a of OCGA § 16-11-126. Subsection d of that statute provides, in relevant part, that the crime of “carrying a concealed weapon,” as previously defined, shall not forbid any person who is not among those enumerated as ineligible for a license under Code Section 16-11-129 from transporting a loaded firearm in any private passenger motor vehicle in an open manner and fully exposed to view or in the glove compartment, console, or similar compartment of the vehicle . . . . Lindsey filed a general demurrer, urging that subsection d was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court refused to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, concluding that the issue was not properly before it. After a bench trial, Lindsey was found guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for entry of an order on the constitutional challenge. Lindsey v. State , 259 Ga. App. 389 577 SE2d 78 2003. On remand, the trial court upheld the constitutionality of the law, and overruled the general demurrer. Pursuant to the trial court’s grant of a motion for an out-of-time appeal, Lindsey appeals from that order. 1. Statutory language is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process requirements so long as it has a commonly understood meaning. Rouse v. Dept. of Natural Resources , 271 Ga. 726, 729 2 a 524 SE2d 455 1999. The “prohibition against excessive vagueness does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes will have some inherent vagueness for ‘In most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.’. . . All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Cit. Wilson v. State , 245 Ga. 49, 531 262 SE2d 810 1980. “In construing the constitutionality of a statute, we must examine it in its entire context.” Bell v. State , 252 Ga. 267, 269 1 313 SE2d 678 1984. Thus, the exempted conduct referenced in subsection d of OCGA § 16-11-126 must be interpreted in pari materia with the conduct that is otherwise subject to prosecution for the offense of “carrying a concealed weapon.”
Under OCGA § 16-11-126 a, a weapon is unlawfully “concealed” on or about one’s person unless it is exhibited “in an open manner and fully exposed to view.” As thus defined, the crime of “carrying a concealed weapon” is clear and unambiguous. Simmons v. State , 262 Ga. 674 424 SE2d 274 1993. The obvious import of the provision is that persons must display their weapons so that those with whom they come in contact ” ‘might see that they were armed and dangerous persons, who were to be avoided in consequence.’ Cit.” Moody v. State , 184 Ga. App. 768, 769 1 362 SE2d 499 1987. Therefore, an armed person does not comply with the mandate of the statute unless his or her weapon is displayed so as to be visible to all observers. Marshall v. State , 129 Ga. App. 733 1 200 SE2d 902 1973.
